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POPULATION AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF
CROATIA (1500-1913) IN THE LIGHT OF 
ANGUS MADDISON’S BOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 
- A MILLENNIAL PERSPECTIVE
VLADIMIR STIPETI∆
ABSTRACT: Based on Maddison’s data on the levels of gross domestic pro-
duct per capita of Italy, the Venetian Republic, Austria and Eastern Europe,
the author calculates through complex procedures an estimate of gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita in Croatia in the period between 1500 and 1913. It
is estimated that in 1500 the Republic of Dubrovnik realised 70% of the GDP
of the Venetian Republic, while the coastal Dalmatian communes achieved
60%. The rural hinterland of Dalmatia and Istria, as well as both Croatia and
Slavonia, had a substantially lower GDP per capita. By weighting these
amounts, the author calculates the GDP per capita of Croatia as a whole. The
situations in 1700, 1820 and 1913 are also estimated in a similar manner, by
starting from regional differences and the realised progress or regress. When
these results are compared with Maddison’s findings, it is concluded that in
around 1500, in terms of its economic development, Croatia was 2% below
the world average, and 25% below the West European average, while in 1913
it was 9% below the world, and as much as 60% below the West European
average.
1. Introduction
The book by Angus Maddison on the world economy viewed from a
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millennial perspective1 inspires admiration for this economic historian (who
sheds light through his work on the lesser known macroeconomic giants in
the economic history of humankind) and at the same time presents a challenge
to other scientists (to consider the path through which their country has
passed, and which has not been dealt with by A. Maddison). With his book,
Maddison throws down the gauntlet to scientists dealing with the world’s
economic history: they should make a choice between accepting his findings,
complementing them with an analysis of their own countries, or finding other
solutions. Maddison is a synthesist: the findings of numerous economic
historians from all over the world have filtered through his critical analysis
and are collected in his retort. A work has grown out of this mixtum compositum
which the present author has taken up as a challenge to view Croatian economic
development in a broader, world context.
First of all, a few words about Angus Maddison. He is an economic historian
who for as many as forty years has been performing the quantitative analysis
of the economic history of the world. He made his mark in world science in
1962 with a piece of work that showed him as an exceptional comparative
economic analyst. This work, dealing with the growth and fluctuations of
the world economy between 1870 and 1960, set the trail that he has persistently
followed for the last 40 years by complementing previous findings with new
facts.2 The book, which we here present only in some of its segments3 is, in
many ways, a synthesis of the author’s perception of the economic history
of the world, and of Western Europe in particular. 
The method used by the author is a macroeconomic one, based on:
a) the determination of the population of the world, regions, and countries,
based on the latest works of historical demography (which have been multiplying
1 Angus Maddison, L’économie mondiale - une perspective millénaire. Paris: Études du Centre
de Développement OCDE, 2001; Angus Maddison, The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective.
Paris, 2001.
2 I will mention only some of his books: Economic Growth in Japan and USSR. London: Allen
and Unwin, 1969; Economic Progress and Policy in Developing Countries. London: Allen and
Unwin, 1970; Phases of Capitalist Development. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; The
World Economy in the Twentieth Century, Paris, 1989; Monitoring the World Economy 1820-
1920. Paris, 1995; Explaining the Economic Performance of Nations: Essays in Time and Space.
Aldeshot: Elgar, 1995; Economic Growth and Structural Change: Comparative Approaches over
the Long-Run: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Economic History Congress, ed. A.
Maddison and H. Van der Wee. Milan, 1994.
3 I will touch only upon the segment of Maddison’s book that is relevant to Croatian parts and
circumstances.
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throughout the world) for the period between 1000 to 2000;
b) the calculation of gross domestic product (GDP and per capita GDP)
in fixed prices. The author provides estimates on GDP employing a number
of works used in the last thirty years to assess the growth dynamics of
individual countries. All these data - expressed in various units of value -
have been converted and are given in terms of the purchasing power of the
international dollar of 1990 (calculated by using the Geary-Khamis method),
thus making them suitable for comparative analysis.
c) the established facts related to the movements of these macroeconomic
values, from which the author draws conclusions on the success or failure of
economic development per country and region, and in the world.
Such an approach allows for the establishment of long-term trends in the
movement of the GDP of nations and the well-being of the population in
these countries (the latter is measured in GDP per capita). Research on the
growth of real income in other periods is conducted today by economic
historians through the quantitative analysis of facts, which has bolstered the
concept of new economic history (sometimes called econometric history or
cliometrics4 ). Maddison’s book deepens knowledge of economic history. It
covers in broad terms the dynamics of the world’s economic development
between 1000 and 1500, and determines in detail the development dynamics
of the world, wider geographic areas and the major countries between 1500
and 1820; it gives precise data per major country after 1820 (the population,
total GDP and per capita GDP); and provides annual data for all major
countries for the period following 1950.
The theme is broad and the author of this paper has neither the intention
nor the possibility of summarising the vast wealth of this magnificent work
in a few pages. Therefore, I will focus on several fundamental macroeconomic
parameters related to the period between 1500 and 1913, which are also
relevant for a consideration of the economic history of Croatia.
The author himself explains the aim of his book. The purpose of this
book, he writes, is to quantify these long-term changes in world income and
population in a comprehensive way; identify the forces which explain the
4 See a new approach for this source: New Economic History, ed. Peter Temin. Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1973; John Hicks, A Theory of Economic History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969; J. D.
Gould, Economic Growth in History (Survey and Analysis). London: Methuen & Co, 1972. To
acknowledge this approach, we should stress that R.W. Fogel, the renowned economic historian,
received the Nobel Prize for economics for his work on the quantitative economic history of the USA.
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success of the rich countries; explore the obstacles which hindered advance
in regions which lagged behind; to scrutinise the interaction between the
rich countries and the rest to assess the degree to which their backwardness
may have been due to Western policy (p. 17). This is an ambitious goal,
which he attempts to reach in his voluminous book (400 pages in the format
of an encyclopaedia). 
We shall focus here on only three aspects of his research: one is related
to the population dynamics in the second millennium of humankind (the
period between 1000 and 1998), the second to the advancement of well-being
in the world in the past millennium, and the third to the division of world
history into periods, and the role of Venice in the economic development of
the world. After that, I will attempt to respond to the challenge that this
book poses for the economic history of Croatia 
2. Population
We will begin the presentation of Maddison’s book with the findings on
the growth dynamics of the world population. In his book, Maddison does
not seek to propound his own estimate of the world population during the
Estimate given by year 1500 1600 1750 1900 1950
Carr-Saunders 1936 .. .. 728 1,608 ..
Benett 1954 446 .. 749 1,555 ..
Cipolla 1962 .. .. 750 1,650 ..
Clark C. 1968 427 498 731 1,668 ..
McEvedy&Jones 1975 425 545 720 1,630 2,500
UN 1995 .. 507* 711 1,590 2,516
Maddison, A. 2001 438 555 754** 1,565 2,524
Table 1 - The world population (1500-1950) (in millions)
*1650. 
**Interpolated by V.S.
Sources: Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, Atlas of World Population History. Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1978; Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1920. Paris, 1995; Angus Maddison,
The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective. Paris, 2001.
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second millennium. He mainly uses previously published estimates, which
historical demographists have been working on for seventy years. These
findings are not significantly different in terms of the size of the world
population (as shown in Table 1), but the differences are more noticeable
when they relate to the population of some regions and/or countries. 
The differences are small for the world as a whole, but they become larger
when individual regions are considered (Table 1). Therefore, we present his
data on the population of the world also by region to show the dynamics and
the regional distribution of the world population (Table 2, Figure 1).
Table 2 - World population (1000-1998), by region
Area-region
year
1000 1500 1700 1820 1913 1998
A. Population (in millions)
THE WORLD 268.3 437.8 603.4 1,041.1 1,791.0 5,907.7
Western Europe 25.4 57.3 81.5 132.9 261.0 388.4
Eastern Europe and former USSR 13.6 30.5 45.4 91.2 235.8 411.9
West-European offshoots* 2.0 2.8 1.8 11.2 111.4 323.4
Latin America 11.4 17.5 12.0 21.2 80.5 507.6
Asia 182.9 283.8 401.8 710.4 977.6 3,515.4
Africa 33.0 46.0 61.0 74.2 124.7 759.9
B. Structure of the world population (world=100)
Western Europe 9.5 13.1 13.5 12.8 14.6 6.6
Eastern Europe and former USSR 5.0 7.0 7.5 8.8 13.1 6.9
West European offshoots* 0.7 0.6 0.3 1.1 6.2 5.5
Latin America 4.2 4.0 2.0 2.0 4.5 8.6
Asia 68.2 64.8 66.6 68.3 54.6 59.5
Africa 12.3 10.5 10.1 7.1 7.0 12.9
*USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - according to A. Maddison’s definition
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First of all, we should mention the exceptional progress of the world
population after 1820. Between 1000 and 1500 the world population was
growing by only 1‰ a year; between 1500 and 1820 the annual growth had
already reached 2.7‰, only to increase to 4‰ in the period between 1820
and 1870; it jumped exponentially to 8‰ before the First World War (1870-
1913), and reached 9.3‰ in the period between 1913 and 1950, in spite of
two world wars which caused huge losses of human lives, the Spanish Flu,
and other calamities. This rate of growth of the world population that had
never been seen before doubled in the period of peace between 1950 and
1973, reaching a growth of as much as 19.2‰ a year. Subsequently, world
population growth slowed, although it remained high, reaching as much as
16.6‰ a year in the last quarter of the 20th century.
Figure 1 - Structure of the world population (1000-1998), by region
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UN demographists are counting on further stagnation in world population
growth in the first half of the 21st century, although, according to their
projection, it could be expected that in as early as 2025 the population of
the Earth will be 8.47 billion.
This high growth in population has not been distributed equally (which
can be seen from the data presented in Table 2). In the last two centuries,
exceptional growth was seen in Africa (a 10-fold growth in population
between 1820 and 1998), Latin America (25-fold - mostly through immigration),
while the population of the West European “offshoots” (Maddison’s term)
multiplied 24 times between 1820 and 1998. A slower growth dynamics in
this period was observed in Asia (a 5-fold growth), Eastern Europe and the
former USSR (4.5-fold), and particularly Western Europe (where growth
was less than 3-fold) - and all this with an average 5.7-fold growth in the
world population in these two centuries. 
It is only natural that such differentiated population growth per individual
area, or per continent, led to a different distribution of the world population
(as shown by item B in Table 2). In the course of the twentieth century the
significance of Western Europe decreased the most in terms of world population
(falling from 14.6% of the world population in 1913 to a mere 6.6% in
1998), and the share of the population of Eastern Europe and the former
USSR in the world population decreased only a little less (from 13.1% in
1913 to 6.9% in 1998). This fall in the significance of Europe in terms of
the world population - halving from 27.7% in 1913 to 13.5% in 1998 (and
as we will see later, also in world product) - led to the collapse of what had
been known as Eurocentrism, a doctrine that interpreted world flows
through the crucial influence of Europe. In contrast to this fall of Europe’s
significance in the 19th and 20th century in terms of world population, the
significance of the population of the West European offshoots, Latin America,
Africa and Asia, increased drastically. We have to add immediately that
these latter three areas have a generally low GDP per capita. Such exceptional
population growth dynamics was seen in countries with a low standard of
living, while, on the other hand, the growth in the standard of living of highly
developed countries slowed the process of population growth.
In order to show the growing differences between the developed and
underdeveloped world, Maddison divides the world into two groups of
countries. One group consists of Western Europe with its offshoots (USA,
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Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and Japan, which are, according to
their condition in 1998, economically highly developed countries. Maddison
labels them A countries. The second group consists of all other countries
(labelled B countries). From the gigantic task of grouping all countries into
these two groups, Maddison obtained Table 3, which is given here in a
summarised form. The following far-reaching conclusion may be drawn:
the population of the developed part of the world has been rapidly decreasing.
At the end of the 20th century, only one seventh (14.2%) of the population
lived in countries enjoying high economic development (compared to
18.2% in 1700 and 16.8% in 1820). However, in 1998, this seventh part of
the population possessed more than half of the world product (53.4%, Figure
2). Each citizen in these countries realised a nearly four times higher GDP
per capita than the average person living on this planet. In 1700, the average
inhabitant of an A country had a 65% higher GDP than one living in a B







A. Population (in millions)
Share of A 110 175 838 18.2 16.8 14.2
Share of B 493 866 5,069 81.8 83.2 85.8
THE WORLD 603 1,041 5,908 100.0 100.0 100.0
B. Gross domestic product (million $ from 1990)
Share of A 100 198 17,998 27.0 28.5 53.4
Share of B 272 496 15,727 73.0 71.5 46.6
THE WORLD 371 694 33,726 100.0 100.0 100.0
C. Per capita GDP ($ from 1990)
Share of A 907 1,130 21,470 147.5 169.4 376.1
Share of B 551 573 3,102 95.9 59.1 54.3
THE WORLD 615 667 5,709 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Angus Maddison, L’économie mondiale - une perspective millénaire. Paris: Études du Centre
de Développement OCDE, 2001: 28
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country. This gap between developed and underdeveloped countries has
been widening; in 1820, the inhabitants of A countries had twice the per
capita GDP as those in B countries, while in 1998, this difference grew into
a 7-fold one. The ratio between the most developed area in the world (Western
Europe) and the most underdeveloped (Africa) amounted in 1820 to 3:1; by
1998, the ratio of per capita GDP between Africa and the West European
offshoots had risen to 19:1. Thus, the division of the world into wealthy
regions and continents on the one hand and into those that were not wealthy
on the other hand, became more evident, and Maddison’s book provides
persuasive facts to support this view. 
Limited space does not allow me to show the reasons that Maddison
gives to explain how humankind, in spite of the proliferation of the population,
was able not only to maintain its existing wealth, but also to multiply it several
Figure 2 - Population trends and GDP in the developed (A) and underdeveloped (B)
world in 1700, 1820 and 1998
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times. The Malthusian fears, which assumed that the population boom
would destroy the material well-being of humanity, did not come true.5
Maddison analyses the stages of this progress (he finds that particular progress
was realised in the second half of the 20th century), the factors of fast
growth, etc. We do not intend to dwell on this - we will only point out
urbanisation (as a side effect of industrialisation) and the change in the socio-
economic structure of the population. Maddison relies on the findings of a
number of authors to determine the beginnings of this fast economic growth
of countries that are today highly developed. To support the thesis that cities
were the main generators of economic growth, he presents Table 4, which
shows the size of cities in Western Europe.
Urbanisation appeared with economic growth after 1600 (see the exceptionally
large population growth in London, Paris, Madrid, Barcelona and Lisbon,
Naples and Vienna), while some other cities stagnated (Venice, Florence,
Cologne, etc.), and others even experienced a decline (Nuremberg, Danzig,
Augsburg, Granada, etc.). Maddison analyses the reasons for the progress of
some, and the stagnation of others (see Venice, the German Hanse towns, etc.).6
5 At the beginning of the 19th century Thomas Malthus established a hypothesis claiming that
the population had the tendency of growing by geometrical progression, while food production
grew by arithmetical progression. Therefore, the plague, starvation, war and other misfortunes
were the unavoidable natural consequences of two divergent tendencies (Essays on Population...,
1808). Although long-term trends continue to contradict T. Malthus, his theoretical offspring are
still present. I will only mention here the book by Paul R. and Anne H. Ehrlich, The End of
Affluence (A Blueprint for Your Future) of 1974 (p. 21), in which the authors foresee that humanity
is facing the most hideous shortage, the shortage of food, which in the sixties led to the premature
death of 10 to 20 million people for the lack of a suitable diet. But this is nothing compared to the
dietary catastrophe which will dominate humankind in the seventies. A situation has been created
which will lead to hundreds of millions of people starving to death. As can be seen, there is no
end to frightening people with the Malthusian nightmare.
6 In 1981, the writer of this work used the data on the city population of Europe presented by
Roger Mols in the famous The Fontana Economic History of Europe, edited by Carlo M. Cipolla in
1976 (Vladimir StipetiÊ, ≈O istraæivanju povijesti stanovniπtva u gradovima Hrvatske«, in Stjepan
KrivoπiÊ, Zagreb i njegovo stanovniπtvo od najstarijih vremena do sredine XIX. stoljeÊa. [Graa za
gospodarsku povijest Hrvatske, vol. 19]. Zagreb: JAZU, 1981: pp. 1-22). When comparing the data
given by Mols with De Vries’s data, it should be stressed that the more recent data are more
complete, because they also included in the group of the largest cities those that Mols had not
mentioned in individual years (let us just mention Rome 1500, Palermo 1600, etc.), but also by
providing new, more precise data on the population in individual cities (thanks to numerous
economic and demographic studies conducted in the last twenty years, in which we should include
those conducted in our country on the population of Zagreb, Varaædin, Zadar, Dubrovnik and other
cities).
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1500 1600 1700 1800
Italy
150 281 216 427
100 139 138 138
100 120 124 135
70 70 72 81
60 71 80 91
55 63 63 71
55 105 100 139
100 220 510 581
50 40 97 100
40 60 64 81
20 40 50 88
40 47 70 60
40 31 51 51
35 50 80 74
30 27 38 32
14 65 200 217
36 40 40 27
30 40 42 42
24 23 .. 23
20 50 50 40
20 48 21 28
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3. The growth of the well-being of humankind
In his latest book, Maddison significantly refined his calculation of GDP
by country in comparison with the study he published in 1995. The methodological
base of the calculation has not changed (based on the 1990 international
dollar calculated according to Geary-Khamis’s method of international
purchasing power parity), but the newly published studies enabled him to more
precisely determine the level and dynamism of product per capita in a number
of countries.7
In the study published in 1995 for the period between 1500 and 1820 (after
this year he was able to use national studies) Maddison relied on three simple
principles related to the growth of per capita GDP: he used S. Kuznet’s
hypothesis that in these three centuries Western Europe had a growth of
7 A. Maddison very critically compares the results he obtained in his book published in 1995
with the results in this one, published in 2001. He finds that his estimate of the world GDP for
1870 was 2.3% higher in 1995, the one for 1913 only 0.8% higher, while the estimates for the
years 1950 and 1990 were almost identical. However, when we arrive at the level of regions, the
differences are more significant, especially in the 20th century (in the earlier work, Maddison
overestimated the progress of Asia during the 20th century, and underestimated the progress
achieved by Latin America, Africa, and Europe and its “offspring”). See: A. Maddison, The
World Economy: p. 175.
Source: J. De Vries, European Urbanisation, 1500-1800. London: Methuen, 1984 (quoted after A. Mad-
dison, The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective. Paris, 2001)
70 69 .. 55
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30 100 165 180
29 43 43 115
27 45 28 40
25 90 96 96
0 49 110 167
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0.2% of GDP/capita per year.8 The rate of growth of Eastern Europe, the
former USSR and Latin America was 0.1% a year, while Asia and Africa
stagnated. In his book, Maddison relied on detailed investigations conducted
by numerous researchers of the economic history of this period, but also on
studies conducted by himself alone. This shows that the realised progress in
Western Europe was somewhat slower than Kuznets had assumed (only 0.15%
a year between 1500 and 1820), although the dynamism of growth was
faster in Latin America and in the West European offshoots. The hypothesis
on the stagnant per capita income in Asia and Africa was confirmed. Although
space does not allow me to list all the authors and countries that form the
foundation for Maddison to build his economic picture of the world in these
three centuries, let us say only that a number of studies were conducted in a
whole range of countries (such as France, Italy, the Netherlands, England,
Spain, and the West European offshoots). I would simply like to stress that,
in my opinion, Maddison obtained in this way a solid basis for assessing the
economic development of the world in the period between 1500 and 1820.
He also added to this his estimates of the conditions of the world at the
beginning of the second millennium (the year 1000), which satisfied his
intention given in the very title of the book: of viewing the world economy
during the second millennium of its new history.
In this overview, I will present Maddison’s findings in an abbreviated
form, skipping a large number of years for which he provides data (1600,
1870, 1950 and 1973), as well as data by major country (Maddison analysed
some 20 countries). I hold that the years presented in Table 5 (and Figure 3)
are sufficient to explain the secular tendencies in the economic development
of humankind, and that those who are interested in individual countries and
years will easily find data on them in the book itself. I particularly emphasise
that the data by country are extremely important for the conducting of specific
research to assess the time and role of other countries not dealt with by
Maddison, for example, Croatia. 
Table 5 presents the basic data on the size of world product in the second
millennium - as provided by Maddison. The data, given in fixed prices,
point to the growth dynamism of both the world and individual regions over
this extended length of time. 
8 Presented in his book: Simon Kuznets, Population, Capital and Growth: Selected Essays.
New York: Norton, 1973.
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First, I will comment on the wide divergence between the progress of
humankind in the first half of the second millennium (when world product
increased 2.1-fold in 500 years) and the progress achieved in the second half
(when world product increased 136-fold). This exceptional result in the
second half of the second millennium bears witness to the freeing of the
enormous creative capacity of humankind, propelled by the spread of literacy
and science that led to new technological achievements, the expansion and
acceleration of communications, and other factors. Humankind “broke out”
Table 5 - World Gross Domestic Product (1000-1998)
Area-region
years
1000 1500 1700 1820 1913 1998
116.8 247.1 371.4 694.4 2,704.8 33,725.6
10.2 44.3 83.4 163.7 906.4 6,960.6
2.6 6.2 10.6 23.1 121.6 660.9
2.8 8.5 16.2 33.7 232.4 1,132.4
0.8 1.1 0.8 13.5 585.6 8,456.1
4.6 7.3 6.4 14.1 121.7 2,941.6
3.2 7.7 15.4 20.7 71.7 2,581.6
78.9 153.6 214.1 390.5 592.6 9,953.0
13.7 18.4 24.4 31.0 72.9 1,039.4
8.7 17.9 22.5 23.6 33.5 20.6
2.2 2.5 2.9 3.3 4.5 2.0
2.4 3.4 4.4 5.4 8.6 3.4
0.7 0.5 0.2 1.9 21.7 25.1
3.9 2.9 1.7 2.0 4.5 8.7
2.7 3.1 4.1 3.0 2.6 7.7
67.6 62.1 57.6 56.2 21.9 29.5
11.8 7.4 6.6 4.5 2.7 3.1
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Figure 3 - Structure of world GDP (1000-1998) 
of its closed civilisations (the Chinese civilisation, for instance, barely had
any contact with the European civilisation until the 16th century, so that the
truth about China, told by Marco Polo in 1298 in his Genoa prison, was for
centuries considered to be a product of his imagination) and was becoming
increasingly global. The speedy intertwining of civilisations, economies and
people accelerated the economic growth of both the world and individual
countries, which began to adapt to the new circumstances. 
However, the development that began in 1500 was uneven. Europe
developed faster than the rest of the world between 1000 and 1500, emerging
from the stagnation experienced after the downfall of the Roman Empire.
Boosted by this initial momentum (quadrupling total GDP in 500 years),
Western Europe continued its speedy development after 1500, reaching a
four-fold increase in total GDP between 1500 and 1820, whereas between
1820 and 1998 its GDP shot up 40 times. The West European offshoots
developed even faster, particularly after 1820, and soared in terms of growth
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of product (between 1820 and 1998 they increased their product by as much
as 625 times). Eastern Europe and Russia advanced at a slower pace (until
1820), but their development also accelerated after 1820 (economic growth
in Eastern Europe in the 19th and 20th century increased 29 times, and in the
former USSR, 34 times), Latin America also recorded a huge growth in
product after 1820 (208 times), while this increase was more modest in Asia
(excluding Japan), where it was only 25-fold, and Africa (a 34-fold increase).
On the other extreme of these relatively unfavourable tendencies related to
Africa and Asia, there is, in economic terms, the exceptionally successful
Japan, which increased its total GDP between 1820 and 1998 by as much as
125 times, enabling it to reach the highest level of the most economically
developed countries. 
This great disparity in the increase of generated GDP led to a different
distribution of generated product of humankind. The data in the lower half
of Table 5 clearly show this. Western Europe increased its share in world
product (from 17.9% in 1500 to as much as 33.5% in 1913; it then fell back
to 20.6% in 1998). The same significant growth was recorded by the West
European offshoots, Latin America and Japan. On the other hand, Asia
(excluding Japan) and Africa recorded a long-term decrease in their share in
the structure of world product, which has only partly been remedied in most
recent times (as seen from the data of 1998).
However, the data presented in Table 5 do not take into account the fact that
humankind during the second millennium also generated significant disparity
in population growth (as shown by A. Maddison in his book, and summarised
in this overview in Table 2). For this reason, the data on the level of per capita
GDP (Table 6) is the actual benchmark of the realised economic growth and
well-being per individual region, or per country. An analysis of these data tells
us that Maddison believes that at the beginning of the second millennium the
world was quite uniform in terms of its level of economic development, in
which Asia (particularly China and Japan) and Africa were in the lead, finding
themselves slightly ahead of the world average, while Europe as a whole was
below the world average. The situation changed from as early as 1500: Western
Europe positioned itself in the lead of the more developed part of the world,
while Asia (excluding Japan) was slightly above the world average. However,
from the middle of the second millennium, dramatic changes occurred in the
level of well-being of the average citizen of individual regions, which we do
not intend to explain here, since Maddison’s data clearly show this. I will,
however, focus on several general conclusions. 
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Humankind now had a standard of living and well-being that was
incomparably higher than ever before. The standard of living of an average
world citizen was 10 times higher in 1998 than it had been in 1500. It is
important to emphasise that in the first half of the second millennium, the
standard of living of the average inhabitant of the planet increased very
slowly (by 30% in these five hundred years); the well-being of humankind
also changed very little in the following 320 years (an increase of only 18%
Area of the world
year
1000 1500 1700 1820 1913 1998
435 565 615 667 1,510 5,709
400 774 1,024 1,232 3,473 17,921
400 462 566 636 1,527 5,461
400 500 611 689 1,488 3,893
400 400 473 1,201 5,257 26,146
400 416 529 665 1,511 5,795
425 500 570 669 1,387 20,413
450 572 571 575 640 2,936
416 400 400 418 585 1,368
92 137 167 185 230 314
92 82 92 95 101 96
92 88 99 103 99 68
92 71 77 180 348 458
92 74 86 100 100 102
98 88 93 101 92 358
103 101 93 86 42 51
96 71 65 63 39 24
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in the period between 1500 and 1820). However, after this, huge improvements
followed in the living conditions of the world, a real explosion of well-being
(an 8.5-fold improvement in the next 180 years). Well-being increased
enormously in the 20th century, especially after 1950. In 97 years (between
1820 and 1913) the well-being of the average inhabitant of the world
increased 2.2-fold; and in the next 85 years (between 1913 and 1998) 3.8-fold
(which shows that the annual increase of well-being was two times faster in
the 20th than it had been in the 19th century). However, this progress was
uneven: Western Europe dynamically improved the standard of living of its
inhabitants, and this continued consistently in the last two centuries of the
second millennium; Eastern Europe and the former USSR advanced at a
somewhat slower pace. After 1820, incredible progress was recorded by the
West European offshoots (a 22-fold growth until 1998) and Japan (31-fold).
On the other hand, in the same period, Asia and Africa achieved modest
growth (5-fold and 3.3-fold respectively). Humankind as a whole was
incomparably wealthier in 1998 than it had ever been before. The increase
achieved in the last 180 years has been greater than that achieved in the
whole written history of humankind.9
In 1500, Western Europe surpassed the world average, increasing over
time the distance between it and the world average - precise data can be
found in the lower half of Table 6. In contrast with Western Europe, the
dynamism of Eastern Europe followed the world average, so that the gap in
the level of economic development between Western and Eastern Europe
widened, which was also the case with the territory of the former USSR.
According to Maddison, a similar differentiation can also be found in Asia.
There, Japan stood out from the Asian average after 1820: the rest of Asia
was lagging behind the world average, while Japan, taking gigantic strides
after 1950, surpassed Western Europe and approached the level of the West
9 This is the opinion of numerous experts who deal with economic history. Thus, E. Gundlach,
≈Das Wirtschaftswachstum der Nationen im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert«. Die Weltwirtschaft,
Vierteljahresschrift des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel 1 (1998): pp. 85-107
writes: “Economic growth during the twentieth century was extremely fast - without precedent in
the history of humankind. Never before had such large parts of the population of many countries
participated to such an extent in creating material well-being as has been the case in this century.
Even the 19th century, for which contemporaries such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels claimed
that it had created miracles different from the building of the Egyptian pyramids, the Roman
aqueducts, or Gothic cathedrals, fades before the miracles created in the 20th century, especially
those in the second half of the 20th century.”
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European offshoots. The worst case was that of Africa. While, at the beginning
of the second millennium it was at the level of the world average, today an
African citizen generates less than one quarter of the world average of well-
being. It can be concluded from the data presented in Table 6 that Western
Europe lost its lead in terms of well-being at the end of the 19th century
when it was overtaken by its offshoots. In 1820, Western Europe was wealthier
than its offshoots, while in 1913 the offshoots had already overtaken Western
Europe (by 51%), and in 1998 this difference was still 46% in favour of the
offshoots.10
These relative relations (according to the world average) should not obscure
the general picture of the progress of human well-being. The standard of living
(well-being) of a world citizen is today 8.5 times higher than it was only
180 years ago. These trends take a number of forms: housing conditions
have improved; drinking water has come to the houses of many world citizens;
electrical power has entered almost every home, and has been put to tens or
even hundreds of uses; we eat better than we ever did before, so that starvation
has almost disappeared, while only as far back as the 20th century it took
millions of victims; although a sixth of the population are still malnourished.
Health conditions have improved, so that life expectancy has been greatly
extended in the world (from 26 in 1820, to 66 in 1999, while in economically
developed countries it already surpasses the age of 80).11 A person today
10 Extensive literature has been published about the causes of this relative lagging behind of
Western Europe, which we do not have the opportunity of considering here. Insight into this type
of literature is provided in the book: J. R. Western, The End of European Primacy. London:
Blandford Press, 1971. The condition of Western Europe would deserve special analysis after the
creation of the European Union through the Rome Treaty (1958).
11 The progress realised in the 20th century was surprising even for great visionaries. The example
of Leon Trotsky was illustrative in this respect. After years of living in Vienna, Zurich, Paris,
London and other West European cities, Trotsky was deported to the USA by the French police
in 1916. In his own words, he says he rented (with his family) “a flat in a workers’ district of
New York and bought furniture on credit. This flat cost me eighteen dollars a month. But it had
some advantages completely unknown to Europe: it had electricity, a gas stove, a bathroom, a
telephone, a cargo lift for things we would send up and for rubbish we would take down”. These
accomplishments of civilisation which could even be found in the workers’ parts of town amazed
Trotsky. Therefore, he wrote: “Europe is destroying the very sources of its wealth while America
is getting rich. Observing New York with envy, I, who have not yet renounced my European
feelings, have been asking myself with anxiety whether Europe would endure… Will not the centre
of economic and cultural life move to America?” Léon Trotsky, Ma vie. Paris: Gallimard, 1953
(emphasis by V. S). This viewpoint of Trotsky’s also shows how Eurocentrism became deeply
nested in the mindsets of all Europeans.
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works less (fewer hours), which leaves more time to pursue his or her interests.
The flourishing of tourism is only one of the consequences of this situation.
This huge progress made in the world has not made humanity happier,
particularly not its poorer part. The demonstrative effect of well-being in
developed world countries is enormous: from the silver screen and from the
TV screen, great expectations rain down on the millions of poor inhabitants of
our planet, along with the belief that in these economically underdeveloped
countries such well-being could be easily and comfortably created. Such
expectations are generally connected with political events: new elections, a
different government and a change in economic policy, or something similar.
However, these expectations are often followed by disappointment; resistance
increases, and some new deus ex machina is expected to appear and create
well-being overnight. But the centennial experience that Angus Maddison so
lucidly presents in his book shows that there is no quick and easy way to social
well-being. This is a thorny path that requires the coordinated activities of all
the stakeholders in the process of economic growth; if only one of these
stakeholders is missing, all other efforts could be in vain.12
However, one reserve should be added here. The general improvement in
the standard of living of humankind (as a whole) has not resolved the issue
of the relative distribution of income and wealth. Although the average
inhabitant of Africa became wealthier in 1998 than his or her predecessor in
1820 (by as much as 3.2 times), in 1998 he or she was farther behind the
standard of living of the inhabitant of a West European “offshoot” than he
or she had been in 1820. The ratio between Africa and offshoots, which was
1:2.9 in 1820, had already reached 1:9 in 1913, and in 1998 was as much as
1:19. The relative gap between the wealthy and poor areas of the world, as
we see, is growing dramatically: so far, neither humankind nor economic
12 In his book, Maddison presents the annual rates of growth of all the time periods covered by
his analysis. I am omitting these, since there are few people who will understand that when analysing
long-term periods, apparently small differences in figures lead to a huge difference in the final result.
Here is one example from Maddison’s book (The World Economy: p. 126): the annual rate of growth
for the period of 1913-1950 of world gross domestic product amounted to 0.91%; it amounted to
2.93% for the period of 1950-1973, and 1.33% for the period of 1973-1998. In 50 years the annual
rate of growth of 0.91 will lead to an increase of 57% (index 157), a rate of 1.33% to as much as
94%, and a growth of 2.93% will be more than quadrupled (index 424). Such relatively
“small” differences in annual rates of growth lead to huge differences when applied to a long period
of time. Many people do not generally know this, so in this overview of Maddison’s work for the
presentation of progress I most often used the index for the period, and not the annual rate of growth.
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science has any precise answer about how to remove this huge inequality in
living conditions.13 The result is growing dissatisfaction with the condition
in which the greater part of the population finds itself, whose members,
consequently, find themselves less satisfied and less happy.14
And finally, I feel compelled to add a personal comment to the exceptional
panorama of the economic development of the world presented in Maddison’s
capital work. When reading this book, I became aware of three factors that
added to my own experiences. First of all was the fact that I had lived my
life in an extremely successful period of economic progress of humanity.
This general image of progress was blurred by the wars I had lived through,
the starvations that occurred, the concentration camps, the prisons of Siberia
13 Simon Kuznets, as far back as in 1955, in his speech to the American Economic Associa-
tion (as its president) explained his hypothesis about income inequality which, in his opinion,
grew in the early stages of economic development, only to decrease later. Kuznets stated this for
an individual country, and not for humanity as a whole, thus the significance of his conclusions
(and the conclusions of his followers) is, nevertheless, limited. See: Simon Kuznets, ≈Economic
Growth and Income Inequality«. The American Economic Review 45 (1955); idem, Modern
Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread. New Haven-London: Yale University Press,
1967; idem, Postwar Economic Growth. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1964. For
the followers of Kuznets’s hypothesis, see J. Williamson, The Great Egalitarian Levelling under
Twentieth Century Capitalism, 1984 and Peter L. Berger, The capitalist revolution: fifty propositions
about prosperity, equality and liberty. New York: Basic Books, 1986.
14 Well-being, satisfaction and happiness are generally considered to be the end goals of human
life: literally everyone wants to be happy. The US Declaration of Independence of 1776, which is
based on the tenets of the Enlightenment, regards this human pursuit of happiness as an inalienable
right, almost at the same level as life and liberty. Many economists derived from this the conclusion
that economics was a means and a way of achieving individual happiness; in this sense, economic
growth, inflation, unemployment, administration and other macroeconomic categories are only at
the service of raising the well-being of individuals, and of achieving a sense of happiness. This is
why economists have increasingly been dealing with the problem of the relation of the well-being
and happiness of individuals, a problem which had been until recently within the domain of social
psychology. Research conducted in individual countries shows that a sense of happiness and
satisfaction grows with an increase in income, but, on the other hand, a high income does not
simply transform itself into a sensation of happiness. Great differences in the level of income
within a country often lead to a feeling of dissatisfaction. However, when observing the time
series, the happiness index does not grow with well-being, which is particularly evident in the
analysis of the sensation of happiness in Japan (after 1950). Studying extensive literature on this
topic, B. S. Frey and A. Stutzer, ≈What Can Economists Learn From Happiness Research«, in:
Journal of Economic Literature 40 (2002), reached the conclusion that there was no strong link
between the level of per capita income and individual happiness. It is obvious that new products
are continually being introduced by fast technological and economic growth, but these products
are years, or even decades, away for many users, and this situation makes them unhappy.
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and Goli Otok, the totalitarian regimes of all kinds, the peaks and troughs of
individual countries, economic policies and concepts. It was not infrequently
that these hurdles and difficulties distracted my (and not only my) attention
from the economic life blossoming in the world as well as in my country.
Maddison allows us to observe economic history from above, providing a
bird’s-eye view, which frees us from the pressure of the current moment,
due to which we sometimes fail to see the wood for the trees (as the saying
goes). 
The second factor is no less important: it says that all this exceptional
progress of humankind is the work of Western civilisation to which I also
belong (although since I have lived in its periphery, the results reached my
people with delay and only partially). The magnificent springtime of creative
humankind, this inexhaustible, continuous scientific, technological, industrial,
intellectual and moral revolution began and continued in Europe and in its
(to use Maddison’s term again) offshoots. This process has been continuing
for almost two centuries, where, let us put it poetically, every day, from year
to year, more and more complex innovations are added to the fund of
discoveries and achievements; the standpoints that have been valid so far
are now being reviewed, and old knowledge is being replaced. These are not
individual events or forms of knowledge; this is a continuous unrolling of
novelties that change the world. This flood of innovations has had no precedent
in the economic and cultural history of humankind, it is an avalanche,
sweeping away the canons of days gone by, creating the world as we know
it today. This is also reflected in the dynamism of the world economy, in the
already mentioned accelerated growth of well-being in countries that generated
this new era of human development. In this sense, it can be said that at the
beginning of the 19th century Western civilisation took up the reins of the
world. Science, which was born here, became real science: we are not just
speaking of exact disciplines (where this contribution is indisputable), but
also of philosophy, medicine, law (which codified the world according to
the Western model), and particularly economics, which, from the position of
being an auxiliary discipline to law (from the end of the 18th century), transformed
itself into what is today a leading social science, leading in many ways the
focused efforts of humanity towards well-being. 
This dominance of West European civilisation suppressed and overpowered
the great classic civilisations of the past (in equal measure the Chinese, Arabic
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or Aztec civilisations). Economic development supported this process:
the exceptional dynamism of economic progress achieved by the West led
to the abandonment of the previous business principles of ancient civilisations.
And the faster the individual nations freed themselves of the burden of their
traditionalism, the easier it was to approach the level of economic growth of
the West. Japan started on this path way back in the 19th century (with the
Meiji dynasty), then Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand and Malaysia in the
1960s, while China with Deng, and India did so only in the last 20 years of the
20th century, generating accelerated economic development and approaching
the level of development of Western countries. 
The third great factor of knowledge, which is boosted by the study of the
panorama of Maddison’s economic history, was that the Western civilisation
itself that had enabled this progress to be made began to decline in number
in the course of the last two centuries. At the beginning of the 20th century,
the West (Western and Eastern Europe and the West European offshoots)
made up 35% of the world population; at the end of the same century, it
made up less than 19%. Eurocentrism (which I had soaked up from my
textbooks in school, and which was the ground from which philosophy and
history, science and art, law and economics, not to list them all - the dominant
forces of the world - sprouted in Europe), which in my youth was the alpha
and omega of humanity, was now losing its former significance, not only
due to the falling significance of the region in terms of population, but also
due to the decrease in significance of these areas in the structure of world
product. By appropriately acknowledging the decisive role of the West in the
economic and social growth of humankind in the second millennium of human
history, we cannot avoid seeing that its former significance is slowly being
transferred to the hands of the broader world, where billions of new beings,
enriched by the experience of the West, compete in the fight for a better
tomorrow. Invoking the contributions that the West has made to humanity
should not give rise to nostalgia for the past, but should become an incentive
for even faster development, especially that of the European periphery,
which has not felt the benefits of the achieved progress to the same extent as
Western Europe. Is not this the ultimate purpose of uniting Europe in the
European Union? 
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4. Some implications of Maddison’s findings on the interpretation of
world history
The findings of Angus Maddison in his latest book cut extensively into
the conventional presentations of human history. In this text, I will focus on
just two aspects of his findings. The first relates to the periodisation of
world history, and the second to Maddison’s view about the role and significance
of the Venetian Republic in the economic development of Western Europe
and the world. 
4.1. About the periodisation of world history
Maddison rightly establishes that the quantification of the facts he derived
on the economic development of humankind allows for a clearer understanding
of history, an understanding that is often left fuzzy by today’s so-called
qualitative historical analysis. The calculated data now help to distinguish
between stylised facts and stylised fantasies which are sometimes perceived
as reality. According to Maddison, it is possible to check the stated facts,
although it should be accepted that they are liable to further analysis and
verification. This promotes analytical scholarly discussion, leading in turn
to new findings, which, with the help of increasingly sophisticated research
methods, will bring us asymptotically closer to the Truth. Furthermore, the
quantitative picture of the world provided by Maddison helps in interpreting
local and national circumstances, since it allows for the determination of
what are normal circumstances and what are exceptional ones for a certain
region or country.15
Maddison first of all emphasises that his findings contradict earlier
assumptions about the duration and pace of the ascension of Western Europe.
In his opinion, there has been an almost universal tendency among historians
to date the ascension of Western Europe around 1500, when Europeans
discovered America and came into direct contact with Asia (Magellan).
Max Weber attributed the dynamic advance of Europe after 1500 to protestant
ethics, and this hypothesis attracted almost universal attention, also since it
was congruent with the conventional assumption of historical science about
the beginnings of the European ascension. Maddison now rejects this theory:
“I no longer believe that there was a sharp break in the well-being of the
15 I am paraphrasing A. Maddison’s views presented on pp. 43-49 of his book (2001).
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population or the pace of advance of per capita income around 1500”, he
states firmly in his new book. 
Maddison’s words can be taken as a kind of self-critique, since in the
1980s he too had accepted these conventional truths. At that time, he agreed
with the opinions of the Nobel Prize winner, S. Kuznets,16 who had claimed
in 1966 that modern economic growth was preceded by merchant capitalism,
which developed from the end of the fifteenth to the second half of the eighteenth
century, and which replaced the previous epoch of feudal organisation.
Somewhat later, S. Kuznets further developed this theory,17 according to
which the accelerated rate of per capita GDP growth in Western Europe in
the period between 1500 and 1750 proved his hypothesis on the merchant
capitalist period. In his book dated 1995,18 Maddison still accepted these
views, but now (after establishing that economic progress was slower than
that suggested by Kuznets, and in the belief that the dynamism of development
such as that in Western Europe between 1000 and 1500 actually continued
over time), he abandons the division of epochs between feudal organisation
and merchant capitalism, and instead, labels the entire period between 1000
and 1820 as “protocapitalist”. Moreover, he also differs from Kuznets, his
former role model, in the timing of the beginning of modern economic
growth (which Maddison calls capitalist development). According to Maddison,
this period did not begin in 1760, but rather in 1820. He claims that the
works of N. F. Crafts19 had helped to break the old dogma of a sudden takeoff
in the second half of the eighteenth century in England. Research shows that
the per capita income in the Netherlands at the end of the 18th century was
higher than that in the United Kingdom. According to Maddison, this was
also confirmed by other recent works in quantitative economic history of
West European countries. For this reason, Maddison takes the year 1820 as
the beginning of modern economic growth, which makes him abandon the
former general belief about the exceptional British role as the driving force
16 S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread.
17 S. Kuznets, Population, Capital and Growth: Selected Essays.
18 A. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992.
19 ≈British Economic Growth 1700-1831: A Review of the Evidence«, in: The Economic History
Review, May 1983; N. F. R. Crafts and C. K. Harley, ≈Output Growth and the British Industrial
Revolution: A Restatement of the Crafts-Harley View«, in: The Economic History Review,
November 1992.
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of the new economic dynamism of the 18th century.20
In a similar way, he refutes the findings of some scientists who claimed that
at the beginning of the 19th century China, Japan and some other Asian
countries were at the same level as Western Europe, and then became poorer
during the 19th and 20th centuries due to the colonial policies of wealthy West
European countries. The advocates of these views were P. Bairoch and M.
Levy-Leboyer21 who claimed that in 1800 China was far ahead of Western
Europe, and that Japan and the rest of Asia were behind Europe by only 5%.
These scientists also considered that Latin America was ahead of North
America in terms of economic development, and that Africa as a whole had
about two thirds of the West European per capita income. Although Bairoch
and his followers could never prove their claims, these assertions were taken for
granted by many renowned historians, such as F. Braudel and K. Pomeranz,22
who, based on these facts, derived far-reaching conclusions about the economic
dynamism of the world in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
In his latest book, Maddison returns to Adam Smith, who in his Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (published in 1776) established
the following ranking of countries per level of economic development:
the Netherlands, Britain, France, the British North American colonies,
20 The scope of this work does not allow me to stress the comprehensiveness of Maddison’s
facts analysis. He refutes the previously dominant ideas claiming that the take-off period had a
different development per individual countries (this is what W. Rostow claimed in Stages of
Economic Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960 and A. Gerschenkron in
Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. New York: Praeger, 1965). He also believes
that the findings on the dynamism of economic development of West European countries indicate
that the acceleration of economic development in the second half of the 19th century had been
much more synchronised than was previously believed.
21 In the book Disparities in Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution. London:
Macmillan, 1981. This edition repeats the earlier thesis expressed by P. Bairoch in the book
Diagnostic de l’évolution économique du tiers-monde 1900-1966. Paris: Gauthiers-Villars, 1967.
22 Fernand Braudel used extensively Bairoch’s work in his monumental three-volume book
Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle Paris: Armand Colin Editeur,
1979. Here, Braudel thanks in particular Paul Bairoch for the large service he provided for
historians (with his estimates of economic development - comment by V.S). In 2000, Kenneth
Pomeranz (in his book The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern
World Economy. Princeton etc.: Princeton University Press) accepts Bairoch’s figures with more
caution, also stressing that it is not very feasible that West Europeans had been more entrepreneurial
than their contemporaries living in densely populated parts of the world before 1750, or even
1800. 
04 Stipetic.QXD  30.07.2004  13:30  Page 134
135V. StipetiÊ, Population and Gross Domestic Product of Croatia (1500-1913)...
Scotland, Spain, the Spanish colonies in America, China and Bengal
(pauperised through the plunder of the East India Company). Smith’s views
were confirmed by D. S. Landes23 who claimed in 1969 that Western Europe
was wealthy even before the industrial revolution - wealthy in comparison
with the circumstances at the time in other parts of the world. This wealth
was the product of hundreds of years of gradual accumulation, based on
investments and allocations of extra-European resources and labour, but also
on significant technological progress, not only in the sphere of commodities
production, but also in the organisation and financing of the exchange and
distribution of commodities. Following this analysis, Landes concluded that
in a period of nearly one thousand years - from 1000 to 1800 - the per capita
income in Western Europe grew significantly, perhaps even tripled. J. C.
Chesnais24 criticised Bairoch’s view, claiming that the whole of the supposed
quantitative analysis of economic development in Bairoch is a kind of
“guesstimate” which would have confirmed his a priori theses on the manner
of pauperisation of the Third World. Maddison, after a number of studies
that he either conducted himself or just initiated, now proudly claims that
the accumulated facts bring the inevitable conclusion that Bairoch and his
epigones were utterly wrong. However, by refuting these writers, I do not
negate the significance of colonial exploitation. My facts only show that it is
necessary to take a more realistic stand in terms of the power of the West
and the weakness of Asia around 1800. 
However, the main problem, according to Maddison, still remains: to
explain how such differences in the level of development of advanced
capitalist countries and the rest of the world occurred. Naturally, there are
examples of the gap narrowing (Japan overtaking China during Tokugawa’s
rule; Western Europe drawing closer to the USA which had soared ahead
after the Second World War; similarly, in the last 25 years, the Tigers of the
Pacific, such as China and India, drawing closer to the developed world,
etc.). This, according to Maddison, remains a huge task for economic science,
since there are no universal schemes to cover all the cases, or all the events
that occurred in the past millennium, and which would explain all the causes of
the different performances of individual countries-regions. 
23 The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. London: Little Brown, 1998. He also wrote the book:
The Unbound Prometheus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
24 J. C. Chesnais, La revanche du tiers-monde. Paris: Laffont, 1987.
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4.2. The role of Venice in the economic development of Western Europe
and the world
Maddison is an expert economic historian who, unlike members of the
Annales School, is not afraid of using macroeconomic indicators. He shows
this tendency especially when assessing the economic progress of Western
Europe. He begins his analysis with the 10th century, which H. Pirenne
characterised as a time of overall stagnation in the European economy.25
Between the years 1000 and 1500, the West European population grew
much faster than anywhere else in the world. Cities with more than ten
thousand inhabitants, where textiles, shoes and other products were
manufactured, began to multiply and their populations increased. All this
was made possible by the rise in agricultural production, but also with the
progress achieved by metallurgy, trade, the maritime economy and other
branches of industry. In order to explain the paths that allowed Western
Europe to become the carrier of the economic development of the world,
Maddison identifies 4 states which symbolise the progress of Western
Europe and which prove that it is misleading to present the West European
experience as a homogeneous or monolithic one. The four case histories that
show the changes in the focus of economic development from state to state
are the following:26
- Venice: the richest and most successful West European economy from
the eleventh to the sixteenth century. 
- Portugal: which was never as rich as Venice, but opened up new trade
routes with Africa and Asia.
- The Netherlands: which was the most developed European country
with the highest per capita GDP between 1600 and 1820.
25 Henri Pirenne wrote: “If we consider that in the Carolingian epoch, the minting of gold had
ceased, the lending of money at interest was prohibited, there was no longer a class of professional
merchants, that Oriental products (papyrus, spices and silk) were no longer imported, that the
circulation of money was reduced to a minimum, that laymen could neither read or write, that
taxes were no longer organised, and that the towns were merely fortresses, we can say without
hesitation that we are confronted by a civilisation that had retrogressed to the purely agricultural
stage; which no longer needed commerce, credit and regular exchange for the maintenance of the
social fabric.” (Mohammed and Charlemagne. London: Allen and Unwin, 1939). Quoted from
Maddison.
26 I am taking over these views from: A. Maddison, The World Economy - A Millennial
Perspective: p. 49.
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- Britain: which followed the Dutch model of international specialisation
and commercial development, building a huge commercial area in Asia, and
took the lead in the level of economic growth during the 19th century. 
I do not wish to consider all of Maddison’s postulates, but would like to
stress only his opinion according to which until 1500 the regions that had
achieved the greatest economic progress within Europe were Flanders (the
centre of wool production, international banking and commerce) and the Italian
city states (Florence, Genoa, Pisa, Milan and Venice). Of these, the most
successful and the richest was Venice. For this reason, the dynamism of the
Venetian economic development is elaborated below in more detail.27
Since part of the territory of today’s Croatia was under Venetian rule
(Istria and Dalmatia), while the Republic of Dubrovnik was also to a significant
extent under Venetian influence (it became independent of Venice in 1358),
I will summarise here Maddison’s basic thoughts about the role of Venice in
the economic development of Europe and the world.28
Venice was the most successful of the North Italian city states in creating
and maintaining a Republic dominated by a merchant capitalist elite. Thanks to
its geographic position and willingness to defend itself, it was capable of
ensuring its autonomy and avoiding the demands of feudal landlords and
monarchs. Maddison points out that Venice developed political and legal
institutions which guaranteed property rights and allowed for the enforceability
of contracts. It was a pioneer in developing foreign exchange and credit
markets; it created a government bond market and a fiscal system that was
efficient and favourable for merchants and for the accumulation of capital.
Furthermore, this was a tolerant secular state where foreigners (Armenians,
Greeks and Jews) had the same rights as domestic merchants. Although
predominantly Catholic, it enjoyed favoured relations with the Byzantine
Empire. After giving these facts, Maddison provides the following assessment
of the role of Venice in the first half of the second millennium: Venice had
a leading role (between 1000 and 1500) in creating trade within Europe
(from Flanders, France, Germany and the Balkans) and the Mediterranean.
It traded with India and other Asian countries (through Syria and Alexandria).
Through trade, it brought to Europe not only precious products (silk and
27 A. Maddison, The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective: p. 52.
28 A. Maddison, The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective: pp. 19, 52-57.
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spices), but also introduced new technologies to Europe (silk and cotton
production, the cultivation of rice to Italy, and the production of sugar from
sugar cane in the Venetian colonies on Crete and Cyprus). This progress was
based on navigation, which depended on the continuous advances in
shipbuilding in the Venetian Arsenal shipyard, and on the use of the compass
and other navigation techniques. In addition, Venice took over and developed
a whole range of institutional innovations, such as banking, accounting and a
credit system, currency exchange, a public finance system, as well as a highly
capable diplomacy - all of which contributed to the ascension of Venice as
the leading economy in the epoch between 1000 and 1500.29
When mentioning the trade routes of Venetian commerce (with the Levant,
the Balkans and Northern Europe), Maddison points out that from as early
as 1171 the city of Venice had about 66,000 inhabitants, and this population
grew to 170,000 in the 16th century. This continuous growth was halted only
by the plague (in 1347/8, 1575/7 and 1630), which took a toll of about one
third of the city’s population (on each occasion when an epidemic occurred),
and by the wars Venice was waging. 
The population of the Venetian Republic in 1557, given by Maddison,30 is
of special interest for Croatian demographic history. At that time, the Republic
of Venice had 2,141,000 inhabitants, where the city itself had 158,000,
the islands in the Laguna 50,000, Istria 52,000, Dalmatia 93,000, Ionia 52,000,
Crete 194,000, and the Italian Terraferma (the hinterland, including Udine,
Friuli, Vicenza, Padoa, Verona, Bergamo, Rovigo and Cremona) 1,542,000.
Cyprus, which had about 166,000 inhabitants in around 1550, should be added
to this list, since it was controlled by Venice between 1489 and 1573.
The progress of Venice was possible thanks to the development of
shipbuilding, which took place in the state Arsenal shipyard, continuously
improving the size and carrying capacity of vessels. Other manufacturing
activities included the glass and crystal industry, and the activities of goldsmiths,
mosaicists, woodcarvers, decorative artists, builders of palaces and others.
There were also other significant activities. For instance, from the 10th century
29 A. Maddison, The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective: p. 19.
30 Maddison mentions 1557 as the year of the census (according to Beloch). Croatian
researchers present the same data, but claim that these data relate to the year 1554. Where does
the mistake lie?
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onwards, Venice had large offices with scribes who copied the classical
works of the masters of Greek and Latin literature. From the second half of
the 15th century (Maddison gives the precise year of 1469), these offices
developed into the graphic industry, printing as many as 20,000 titles by the
mid-16th century. Venice established its sugar plantations on Crete and
Cyprus (using agricultural techniques borrowed from Syria, and based on
slave labour), from which it supplied Europe with this, at the time, extremely
valuable product. Until the end of the 15th century, Venice held a near
monopoly on the import of spices from the Far East to Europe (1,600 tons a
year), which declined to less than 500 tons at the beginning of the 16th
century. 
All these signs of prosperity slowly started to evaporate with the development
of trade in the Atlantic, and the penetration of Portugal and the Netherlands
in the world markets. This is why, Maddison writes, from the sixteenth to
the eighteenth century Venice did not significantly increase its per capita
income, although it still remained one of the wealthiest parts of Italy and
Europe, until overtaken by the Dutch in the 17th century. 
I am presenting here Maddison’s findings in more detail, since it seems
that Croatian historiography has not emphasised until now that the maritime
part of Croatia had been for centuries within the boundaries of what was
then the richest country in the world. Literature and science developed within
the framework of the existing general prosperity, although on the periphery
of the Venetian state. The Republic of Dubrovnik, although independent
from 1358, was undoubtedly in the sphere of this most prosperous part of
the world. As Maddison writes, the Dubrovnik Statute (of 1272) took over
to a significant extent the commercial provisions from the Venetian legislation,
and this was even more the case with other Dalmatian and Istrian communes.
The magnificent palaces and cathedrals, country mansions and libraries,
monasteries and churches all embodied the well-being that at that time
reigned in our region. So, it is good when people, with a bird’s-eye view,
look over their economic past to observe more clearly the outlines of this
history. Thanks to Maddison, we know that part of the Croatian territory at
that time belonged to the richest region of the world, which was never the
case later on. And this, inevitably, had a specific impact on the flourishing
of art and science, but also on the well-being of the population. 
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5. An attempt to incorporate Croatia into Maddison’s quantitative analysis
of economic development between 1500 and 1998
Maddison’s works (1995 and 2001) have long been in my possession; his
findings have occupied my thoughts - I could even say that they have
obsessed me. I have always wanted, as an economist with a quantitative-
analytic slant, to see more clearly and more precisely what our position was,
what happened in economic terms, and how we arrived at the economic situation
we find ourselves in today. Like many of my colleagues, I believed that one
day it would be possible to comparatively measure the condition and dynamism
of the Croatian economy in the past and attempt to identify the forces that
determined our economic flows. 
At secondary school, I accepted the beliefs of my teachers who claimed
that the whirlwind of history had destined us to struggle for bare survival
against the onslaught of the Hungarians, Mongolians and Ottomans; that
centuries of foreign rule had robbed us of our natural wealth and the fruits
of our labour, and that this was why we were pauperised and why we lagged
so far behind the well-being of the West. The synthesis of these beliefs held
by my former teachers and role models was recently expressed in contemporary
language by Ive Maæuran who believed that while Croatia was bleeding and
living through fateful moments of its historical drama, the civil revolution in
Western Europe was successfully being conducted. In the West, opportunities
were opened up for science and culture to flourish, and for an increase in the
material wealth of the population. Unlike Europe, Maæuran goes on to say,
the once blooming, economically powerful and densely populated Croatian
regions, where life had been good and comfortable, and which enjoyed a
much better and higher standard than many parts of Western Europe,
were turned into a terrible wasteland… Besides the Ottoman invasion, Croatia
and the Croatian people lived through a real catastrophe such as no people
in Europe had ever experienced before.31 Such a view expressed by Ive
Maæuran is also supported by Jakov Gelo, who extends and elaborates on
Maæuran’s opinion.32
31 Ive Maæuran, Hrvati i Osmansko carstvo. Zagreb, 1998: p. 310 (emphasis by V. S.).
32 Jakov Gelo, ≈Kratka povijest hrvatskoga puta u stvarnu demografsku provaliju«, in: Hrvatska
demografska i demostrateπka drama, ed. Vlatko PavletiÊ. Zagreb: “Antun Gustav Matoπ” d.d.,
Samobor i Udruga “11. sijeËnja 1972”: Zagreb, 2002: pp. 73-76.
04 Stipetic.QXD  30.07.2004  13:30  Page 140
141V. StipetiÊ, Population and Gross Domestic Product of Croatia (1500-1913)...
This perception of the historical development of Croatia prevails among
historians and intellectuals, and I do not think that we should additionally
support it here by presenting the thoughts of other writers. Thus far it is unclear
upon what facts this belief is founded. Is there any proof that would constitute
the grounds for claiming that in Croatia life had been much better and of a
higher standard than in many parts of Western Europe, as Maæuran writes,
and Gelo and other authors maintain? The answer is, unfortunately, negative:
no comparative research has been conducted in our country to confirm the
aforementioned hypothesis, especially not for Croatia as a whole. 
Challenged by Maddison’s research, I attempted to assess the real conditions
in Croatia between 1500 and 1913 from the standpoint of two macroeconomic
benchmarks: population and GDP per capita.
5.1. Population
Croatian historical demography has made extensive progress in the last
thirty years, continuously and more precisely penetrating deeper into history.
Thus, Mirko KorenËiÊ accurately determined the population of Croatia from
1857 to 1971 by settlements;33 in the Preface to KorenËiÊ’s edition, Vladimir
StipetiÊ also estimated the population of Croatia in 1800;34 Jakov Gelo refined
these estimates and presented data on the population of Croatia in 20-year
intervals from 1780 onwards;35 after that, Jakov Gelo and Stjepan KrivoπiÊ
presented a documented picture of the number of inhabitants in Croatia in
1700.36 Many later works, which went even deeper into history, contain precise
data for individual cities or regions (Stjepan KrivoπiÊ, Ante GabriËeviÊ, and
others) and for earlier periods (especially Nenad VekariÊ37). Consequently,
the picture of the population of Croatia in the past has been constantly
improving and has become more accurate. By using the estimates of these
33 Mirko KorenËiÊ, Naselja i stanovniπtvo SocijalistiËke Republike Hrvatske (1857-1971).
[Djela JAZU, vol. 54]. Zagreb: JAZU, 1979.
34 Vladimir StipetiÊ, ≈Predgovor«, in: KorenËiÊ Mirko: Naselja i stanovniπtvo SocijalistiËke
Republike Hrvatske: pp. IX-XXII.
35 Jakov Gelo, Demografske promjene u Hrvatskoj 1780 do 1981. Zagreb: Globus, 1987.
36 Jakov Gelo and Stjepan KrivoπiÊ, Razvitak stanovniπtva na tlu Hrvatske. Zagreb: Institut za
ekonomska istraæivanja, 1990.
37 Nenad VekariÊ, ≈Broj stanovnika DubrovaËke Republike u 15, 16. i 17. stoljeÊu«. Anali
Zavoda za povijesne znanosti HAZU u Dubrovniku 29 (1991): pp. 7-22.
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assiduous scientists, I (boldly) decided to estimate the population of the
territory of today’s Croatia in the year 1500.
Currently, the only accurate data are provided by the estimate of
the population of the Dubrovnik Republic in 1498. This calculation,
based on historical sources, was conducted and published by Nenad VekariÊ.
Nevertheless, not even these facts are indisputable. The author himself,
when presenting the results of his analysis, writes that this result should be
accepted with some reservation, awaiting confirmation from other sources
and studies, since it is based upon data from an original that has disappeared,
hence leaving itself open for misinterpretation. There is no doubt, however,
that the Republic of Dubrovnik had more inhabitants in 1498 than in the
16th century. But the question of the accuracy of the analysed values still
remains. The understandable reason for the author to distance himself from
the presented findings required critical consideration, which I carried out.
VekariÊ’s figure (of 88,500 inhabitants) shows an extraordinary density of
population in the territory of the Republic of Dubrovnik (90 inhabitants per
square kilometre), which is a density that would have been difficult to sustain
at that time. Therefore I assessed that the population in 1500 was 10% lower
than VekariÊ’s estimate and that it amounted to 80,000 souls (which is still
a dense population of 83 inhabitants per square kilometre).38
In doing this, I would like to stress that the reason for reducing VekariÊ’s
estimate was the conviction that some of the households included in the
census were inhabited by bachelors and childless widows who inhabited up
to one eighth of the total number of households (as the Turkish defters
showed),39 which diminishes the estimated number of residents per household.
Therefore, I reduced VekariÊ’s estimate of the population of the Dubrovnik
Republic by 10%, conforming to VekariÊ’s assessment that the estimate of
1498 is the least certain, and hence, the possible departure from the actual
condition exceeds 10%.40
38 N. VekariÊ, ≈Broj stanovnika DubrovaËke Republike u 15, 16. i 17. stoljeÊu«: p. 20 (italics
by V. S.)
39 The defter of the Sanjaks of the Herzegovina vilayet provides data about the total number
of households (the number of unmarried persons in brackets) in the villages near Dubrovnik: Biograd
(by Nevesinje) 146 (15); Jasenjani (Mostar) 25 (3); Dabrica (Stolac) 37 (6); MeËa (Stolac) 51 (5);
Ravno (Trebinje) 47 (2); »avaπ (Trebinje) 11 (2); KuËiÊi (Trebinje) 16 (3); etc. See: Ahmed S.
AliËiÊ, PoimeniËni popis sandæaka vilajeta Hercegovina. Sarajevo: Orijentalni institut, 1985.
40 N. VekariÊ, ≈Broj stanovnika DubrovaËke Republike u 15, 16. i 17. stoljeÊu«: p. 18, note
with Table 13 (emphasis by V. S.).
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My estimate of the population of Dalmatia and Istria in 1500 is based on
the population determined in the Venetian report dated 1554. This report,
however, also includes smaller parts of these two historical regions which
are not part of Croatia today, but does not include the inhabitants of the
Mark-earldom of Pazin (which was in the hands of the Habsburg dynasty
from as early as 1374), nor does it include parts of Dalmatia that were then
part of the Ottoman Empire. I excluded from the data presented in Table 7
all the parts that were not included in modern Croatia, and estimated the
population for those parts of Croatia which were not included in the Venetian
data. Naturally, these are rough estimates.
Tomislav Raukar rightly indicates (1997) that any analysis of demographic
events in the area of Croatian lands is extremely complex because it faces
an insurmountable obstacle in that the sources before 1500 do not contain
any data at all which would form the basis of even the most modest
quantification of demographic estimates. Nevertheless, he stresses that there
are sources and partial data for the period following 1526 (the Zadar census,
etc.) that allow us to observe some changes in the coastal regions, even
though in this sense, the hinterland remains unknown. However, Raukar also
talks about the trend of depopulation of the hinterland once Bosnia fell
under Turkish rule (1463). Some later studies, which will be mentioned
here, show that this hinterland was not a tabula rasa since new data for this
region are constantly being discovered (the Turkish 1477 defter for Herzegovina,
for example, also contains data for some areas that are today in Croatia).
The published data on Venetian Istria (Erceg,41 Bertoπa42), as well as on
numerous islands and settlements in Dalmatia and Istria (BeziÊ-BoæaniÊ,
Bertoπa, JutroniÊ, Kapor and others), have obviously changed this condition,
allowing insight into the conditions present in this territory in the 16th
century. It should be taken into account that the preserved sources consist of
an incidental statistical sample which may be representative of the given
historical regions, and that basic trends can be determined by using these
sources. However, it is not possible to obtain accurate data for the region as
a whole, or for the territory of Croatia as a whole. 
I will begin my estimate of the population of Croatia in 1500 with the
weakest point - the population in Croatia and Slavonia, i.e. in the northern
41 Ivan Erceg, ≈Dva i pol stoljeÊa kretanja stanovniπtva Istre (1554-1807)«, in: GunjaËin
zbornik, ed. I. Erceg et al. Zagreb, 1980: pp. 229-250.
42 Miroslav Bertoπa, MletaËka Istra u XVI. i XVII. stoljeÊu, I. Pula: Istarska naklada, 1986.
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part of the country. This is a rough estimate, since for this period we can
find only partial data and data from fiscal censuses (extracted from the
archives and published with extraordinary diligence by AdamËek and Kampuπ43).
The estimate of the population of Croatia and Slavonia which I present here,
before the Ottoman occupation of this part of Croatia, is based on the number
of family holdings established through fiscal censuses before 1500, and on
the assessment that 10 family members resided under one roof (this is how
many members generally lived in one household in the Dubrovnik coastal
area and in Konavle in 1498 based on the census of that period). In 1494,
Croatia and Slavonia had 23,225 family holdings in four counties. I added
to this the estimated number of family holdings south of the river Sava, as
well as the estimated number of persons who were not liable for land tax
(inhabitants of cities, noblemen, clergy, etc.). Since this is a very rough estimate,
it can be used only for guidance.
However, I emphasise that through the exceptional effort and diligence
of many researchers (KrivoπiÊ, GabriËeviÊ, Budak, Buturac, Feletar, KolariÊ,
PetriÊ and others) it has been possible to greatly improve our knowledge of
the population of Croatia in the 16th and 17th centuries.44 It may be expected
that an analysis of the Turkish censuses of Slavonia (which Ive Maæuran
announces to be a task for the future) will shed light on this unknown part
of Croatian demographic history. Since, according to my preliminary estimate,
more than 70% of the Croatian population lived within the territory of Croatia
and Slavonia (compared to 75% in 1700 and 78% in 1780!), it is necessary
to explain the factors that caused the decrease in the number of inhabitants
in this area between 1500 and 1700, from which the reduced significance of
the total population of Croatia in 1500 may be derived. 
The most significant factor was the Ottoman invasions, which began to
penetrate the territory of today’s Croatia immediately after the Turkish victory
at Kosovo (1389). The first incursion of light cavalry soldiers - akinji - into
Slavonia and Srijem was recorded as early as 1391. Five years later, in 1396,
43 Josip AdamËek and Ivan Kampuπ, Popisi i obraËuni poreza u Hrvatskoj u XV i XVI stoljeÊu.
Zagreb: SveuËiliπte u Zagrebu, Institut za hrvatsku povijest, 1976.
44 A useful view of these new investigations was provided by Hrvoje PetriÊ in his work:
≈Temeljne osobine demografskog i ekonomskog razvoja gradskih naselja na prostoru danaπnje
sjeverozapadne Hrvatske na razmei kasnog srednjovjekovlja i ranog novog vijeka«, in: StvaralaËki
potencijali u funkciji druπtveno-ekonomskog i kulturnog razvoja sjeverozapadne Hrvatske. Zagreb-
Varaædin: Zavod za znanstveni rad HAZU u Varaædinu, 2002: pp. 133-152.
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they penetrated into the valley of Poæega, the surroundings of Naπice, and,
moving along the valley of the river Drava, they arrived in Ptuj (in today’s
Slovenia), and conquered and temporarily occupied the town. This pressure
of the Ottoman Empire on the north of Croatia, the regions on and around
the rivers Drava and Sava in particular, could be felt throughout the 15th
century, and had consequences on the size of the population of Croatia in
1500. The population of Croatia and Slavonia in the 15th century was subject to
growing pressure from the emerging Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact,
Belgrade managed to fight off the Ottoman siege in 1456 (with the help of
the Croatian troops which had arrived as part of Janos Hunyadi’s and John
of Capistrano’s army of crusaders), but this was not sustained for long.
Smederevo fell in 1459 and, with it, the Serbian medieval state. In 1463 the
Bosnian kingdom was also defeated, and King Stjepan TomaπeviÊ was
decapitated by the conquerors. The Turkish troops invaded Lika and Krbava.
With the districts of Jajce, Srebrenica and MaËva being taken back into
Christian hands, King Matthias Corvinus established a cordon sanitaire in
1465 opposite the Sanjak of Bosnia. This was a border area where in the
following fifty years ruthless battles would be fought between the Croatian
inhabitants and the Turkish troops. The focus of the akinji raids in the first
part of this period was more often the hinterland of Dalmatian towns (Zadar,
©ibenik and Split), but the akinji troops penetrated as far as Istria, and even
as far as Celje and Ljubljana. These Turkish raids planted the seeds of fear:
the akinji plundered cattle and provisions (leaving armies without logistic
support), set houses on fire, and captured civilians and soldiers. They were
paid for their military activity through the ransoms they demanded (for
noblemen) or by selling people (serfs and peasants) into slavery. Towards
the end of the 15th century, decisive battles of regular armies took place: on
the Krbava field (on 9 September 1493), Jacub-pasha routed the Croatian
army led by ban Ivan DerenËin. On this occasion, the flower of the Croatian
nobility was slaughtered, and DerenËin himself was captured. 
Who were the akinji that pillaged countries far beyond the Ottoman
Empire? Studying the reports sent from the region of Friuli to Venice, Roberto
Tirelli45 claims that these were inhabitants of the Balkan regions, from Bosnia
and Herzegovina. There is no doubt they were Muslims, but not serving the
45 Roberto Tirelli, 1499, Corsero li Turchi la patria (Le incursioni dei Turchi in Friuli). Por-
denone: Biblioteca dell’immagine, 1998: pp. 32-33 (emphasis by V. S.).
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holy war propagated by the prophet Mohamed; they were simply peasants
and shepherds that hunger had turned into warriors. These small cavalry
units, according to the author, would cross the river Una, and going further
west, they would cross the river Isonzo and enter Friuli. This is where the
cruel ritual, already familiar to Croatia, would begin: houses and homes
would be burnt, cattle slaughtered, women raped, and property and treasure
pillaged.46 Friuli was subjected to this horror on several occasions between
1477 and 1570. 
The Pope’s envoy reported (in a letter dated 14 September 1493) that the
village population had fled their homes and had found refuge in the woods.
This marked the further depopulation of Croatian territory, which was
reported to Pope Alexander VI by the Noblemen’s Assembly (held in April
1494 in BihaÊ) in the following terms: “We have lost our fathers and brothers,
we have lost our kin, in short, we have lost all our possessions. The Turks
are among us; with fire and sword they ceaselessly devastate and pillage our
homeland, leading us, our fathers and our children, into grinding slavery”.
And this was followed by the most piercing claim: “Since apart from our
ill-fated language we know no other, and since, after losing all our possessions,
we are not able to scatter to other parts of the world, whether we like it or
not we will have to bear the loss of our souls and Christianity in order to
find a way of remaining in our homeland together with our persecutors, and
not be forced to disperse in foreign lands.47
It is difficult from our historical distance of more than 500 years to judge
to what extent the noblemen’s warning to the Pope about them having to
abandon Christianity was a cry for military and other help, and to what extent
it represented a realistic calculation of the catastrophe that was expected.
However, the fact that this solution was at times actually carried out after
the arrival of the Turks in Bosnia shows that it was not some fanciful notion,
but a real possibility set before the nobility. The view expressed by the
noblemen about abandoning Christianity seems to have been more than just
an empty threat made on the spur of the moment. In their letter to Emperor
46 R. Tirelli, 1499, Corsero li Turchi la patria: pp. 144-5. I would like to thank Miroslav
Bertoπa, an exceptional connoisseur of these parts and conditions, for supplying this book to me.
47 Ferdo ©iπiÊ, ≈Rukovet spomenika o hercegu Ivaniπu Korvinu i o borbama Hrvata s Turci-
ma (1473-1496)«. Starine JAZU 38 (1937): pp. 77-78.
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Maximilian, the nobility made virtually the same statements: “If we do not
receive help, we will not be able to defend ourselves from the Turks, the
wars we waged with them have broken us, our towns and homes are virtually
empty, our underlings and serfs have been taken away, and our estates ravaged,
plundered and burnt to the ground. Until now we have refused all kinds of
offers made by the Turks, because we thought that the Emperor and the
princes would finally resist the Turkish force enabling us to remain connected
with the Christian world. But now this is impossible - the Turks have set a
deadline of spring or summer, by which time we have to respond by pledging
our subservience.48
In as early as 1494, the Turks invaded Croatia, Slavonia and Styria, burning
homes and taking slaves. The Turks were not alone in this, since the troops
that came to help Croatia did the same. This is why King Vladislas II (on 9
February 1494) ordered his commanders not to rob people of their possessions,
but to pay in cash for anything that they took. The fear of death and plunder
became an everyday fact.49 The population, terrified by rape and pillage,
and fearful of their precarious future, began leaving their homes and heading
for Hungary, Austria, Slovakia and Bohemia.50 These sporadic invasions
and wars continued almost without respite over the next hundred years,
increasingly extending towards the west the territory occupied by the Ottoman
Empire.
48 F. ©iπiÊ, ≈Rukovet spomenika o hercegu Ivaniπu Korvinu«: pp. 78-81, quoted after: I.
Maæuran, Hrvati i Osmansko carstvo: pp. 50-51 (italics by V. S.).
49 F. ©iπiÊ, ≈Rukovet spomenika o hercegu Ivaniπu Korvinu«: pp. 70-71.
50 Mirko ValentiÊ writes about this in Enciklopedija Jugoslavije (2nd edition, article
≈GradiπÊanski Hrvati«): “To escape the incursions of the Turkish martolos during the 15th and
16th century, Croatians fled in several directions. The direction of the exodus towards the northwest,
or over the River Drava, was the most extensive one. It extended through the counties of western
Hungary, filled the plane between Vienna and Bratislava, led across Moravia all the way to the
White Carpathians. In the first waves of the exodus, which involved the population of Lika and
Krbava bordering the Turkish provinces, from 1503 to 1527 almost all the settlements from the
Una River to Mount Velebit and from Mount Kapela to the Kupa River in the region of Gorski
Kotar were burnt down. The people that the Turks had not managed to abduct fled most often to
the north, to western Hungary, and to the west, to Carniola. Only a smaller part of the population
remained in the valleys closer to the Kupa River and around »abar and Brod, as well as in the
coastal fortifications extending from Senj to Rijeka. The martolos penetrated to the most remote
villages, and sold their prisoners in special markets at a very high price. One ducat would be paid
for a young man or woman. This is why the martolos tried to capture as large a number of young
people as possible. The fear of Turkish slavery will be a strong motive for migrations…”. 
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But the people’s real misfortune began with the fall of Sirmium and Belgrade
(in 1521), and Knin, Omiπ and Skradin (in 1522), which culminated in the
defeat at Mohács (in 1526). Stjepan BrodariÊ bears witness that the Turks
on that occasion executed or captured nearly 200,000 people, with attacks
reaching as far as Buda.51 In the following year, the Banovina of Jajce fell
into Turkish hands, and in 1537 the Turks also conquered the fort of Klis
and the entire territory of Slavonia. All this accelerated the migration of the
population. Croats were beginning to settle in Burgenland, and also left for
Slovakia and Bohemia, where the feudal masters received them as serfs.
Although the population had been continuously deserting their homes and
moving westward since the first Turkish invasions at the end of the 14th
century, the exodus accelerated after the fall of Virovitica and »azma (in
1552) and the arrival of the Turkish troops on the other side of the river Una
(in 1556). However, emigrations from Croatia had begun before that. At the
beginning of 1551, ban Nikola ©ubiÊ Zrinski wrote to Toma Nadásdy: “I am
staying here in Croatia in our deserted towns, where we do not hear anything
that is either good or new; the only thing we can see in our homeland is
desolation”.52 Along with the Turkish conquests came the plague (1553/4)
spreading from Slavonia, which was occupied by the Turks, to Meimurje,
having a devastating effect on the population. All this diminished the number
of inhabitants in the territory of today’s Croatia in the 16th century (Table 7).
We should mention here that all the research conducted so far in relation
to these migrations has considered only one side of the issue. There are
numerous records of Croatians retreating from the Turks into Romania,
Hungary, Slovakia, Austria, Moravia and Southern Italy. Generally, they
moved in groups, and when they arrived, they would establish new villages
and settlements. Many have kept their language and surnames until the
present day. On the other hand, Croatians abducted and sold into slavery by
the Turks generally dispersed into distant settlements in the Near East and
became assimilated. There are few contemporary records about these
people. However, one example from 1532 shows how the Turks captured
and took into slavery Juraj Hus from Rasinje (near Koprivnica, in northern
51 Stjepan BrodariÊ, MohaËka bitka 1526. (De Confllictu Hungarorum cum Solymano
Turcarum imperatore ad Mohach historia verissima), translated by S. Srπen. Vinkovci, 1990
(quoted after: I. Maæuran, Hrvati i Osmansko carstvo: p. 67).
52 Quoted after: I. Maæuran, Hrvati i Osmansko carstvo: p. 115.
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Croatia). As a slave, and later a trumpeter, he lived in different parts of the
Ottoman Empire for eight years. Later, escaping from Turkey, he arrived in
Croatia and then travelled further west where he wrote a manuscript which
was widely read and transcribed about the conditions in the Ottoman Empire.53
An even older source is the testimony of Konstantin MihailoviÊ (around
1435-1500), a miner in the Novo Brdo silver mine, originating from the
nearby village of Ostrovica, mentioned in the records of Dubrovnik merchants.
MihailoviÊ was “recruited” as a janissary in 1453, was among the janissary
troops which conquered Constantinople, and was captured by the Hungarians
during the fighting in Bosnia in 1463. He even appeared (perhaps as a witness
of Turkish conditions?) at the French court, from where he went to Poland
and completed his manuscript Memoirs of a Janissary (in Polish). There
have been several Serbian translations of this book. I will only give here the
colourful description of the Turkish assaults: “The Turks call their swift
horsemen akinji, meaning flying, and they are like hard rain pelting down
from the clouds. These rainstorms cause vast floods streaming down and
sweeping away everything in their path. But the rainstorm does not last
long. In the same way, the swift Turkish horsemen neither last nor stay long
in the same place, but whatever they grab, they drag away, plunder, kill and
destroy, so that for many years not even a cockcan crow in that place”.54
Before giving an overview and analysis of the size of the population of
Croatia, I must point out some of the weaknesses in the estimates for 1500,
which I am aware of, but see no way of resolving. These are individual
data, but since they generally concern towns (which were more or less fortified,
and thus were not so much the target of invasion by the lightly-armed akinji),
it is difficult to claim that they accurately reflect the movement of the
population over the entire territory (poorly defended rural areas were a
more popular target of attacks by irregular troops). In the city of Zagreb, for
example, the population decreased from about 4,500 in 1450 to around 3,600
in 1668.55 The population of Varaædin, for some time the capital of Croatia,
marked a decline from the end of the 16th century until 1770. The situation
53 The oldest known manuscript is that of 1548, but the Croatian translation of 1881 is based
on the 1566 manuscript. Petar MatkoviÊ in Rad JAZU 65 (1881) also published a study on the author,
and Petar Grgec wrote Od Hrvatske do Indije: lutanja i putovanja Jurja Rasinjanina, Zagreb,
1933, based on the same manuscript.
54 Konstantin MihajloviÊ iz Ostrovice, JanjiËarove napomene. Beograd, 1966: p. 69.
55 S. KrivoπiÊ, Zagreb i njegovo stanovniπtvo od najstarijih vremena do sredine XIX. stoljeÊa.
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in Dalmatia was similar.56 For instance, the population of Zadar also decreased
from 8,051 in 1527 to a mere 3,181 inhabitants two hundred years later (in
1714).57
Maddison’s data are related to the census conducted in Venetian Dalmatia.
Therefore, my primary task was to establish the territory included in the
Venetian estimate of the population of Dalmatia and Istria.
I will begin with the facts as listed by Grga Novak.58 As early as 1474,
the Turks conquered the Venetian Shköder, in 1482 Herceg-Novi, in 1499
Makarska, in 1521 Knin, in 1527 Obrovac on the river Zrmanja, in 1537
Klis, and in 1538 Vrana and Nadin. In 1540 the Ottoman Empire established
the Sanjak of Klis, including Dalmatia from the river Krka to the south, as
well as Drniπ, Vrlika, Sinj, etc., and Livno and GlamoË in Bosnia, so that it
reached all the way down to the Rama, Vrbas and Pliva rivers. Therefore,
almost the entire Northern part of Dalmatia was not included in the Venetian
census of 1554. 
I had to estimate the population of this area. Thanks to the diligent work
of our Turkologists, it is possible to estimate the population in these parts on
the basis of the Turkish defters. What does history reveal about this? The
translation of the Turkish defters for our areas was initiated by the work of
Hazim ©abanoviÊ.59 The Ottoman administrative governments listed in these
defters the administrative and territorial division of a particular territory (usually
a sanjak), settlements with a list of their inhabitants (!) and with their fiscal
obligations, but also the abandoned settlements that the Turkish government
leased or exploited in other ways. This provides an exceptional basis for the
study of socio-economic relations. The first such defter from Herzegovina
was published by A. S. AliËiÊ in Sarajevo in 1985; it also showed the
conditions in 1477 in some parts of Croatia that were then part of that vilayet.60
56 Ante GabriËeviÊ, Stanovniπtvo Varaædina tijekom minulih stoljeÊa. Zagreb-Varaædin: Zavod
za znanstveni rad HAZU Varaædin i Grad Varaædin, 2002.
57 Grga Novak, ≈Presjek kroz povijest grada Zadra«, in: Zbornik Grad Zadar - presjek kroz
povijest. Zadar, 1996: pp. 7-75.
58 Grga Novak, Proπlost Dalmacije. Zagreb: HBZ, 1944: pp. 187-202.
59 Hazim ©abanoviÊ, Krajiπte Isa-bega IshakoviÊa. [Monumenta Turcica, vol. 2]. Sarajevo:
Orijentalni institut, 1964; Hazim ©abanoviÊ, Turski izvori za istoriju Beograda, Book I, vol. 1,
Katastarski popisi Beograda i okoline 1476-1566. Beograd: Istorijski arhiv Beograda, 1964.
60 A. S. AliËiÊ, PoimeniËni popis sandæaka vilajeta Hercegovina.
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Fehim Dæ. Spaho complemented this pioneering effort with a number of
works in which he analysed the Turkish defters for the parts of Dalmatia
conquered by the Turks.61 Significant for our study of the population in
1544 are the claims by Spaho that after settlements in the hinterland of Split
had been taken, the larger part of the population fled, so that only less settled
agricultural land with remnants of the earlier settlements remained and
were, as such, pronounced (in 1528) to be mezra (hamlets).62 However, Spaho
goes on to say that the population soon began to return to their homes, so
that the conditions were again met for these settlements to be pronounced
villages (the 1550 defter).63 In fact, our estimate of the population in the
Dalmatian hinterland is based on this analytical claim made by Fehim Spaho.
Based on the map of the settlement given by the author, it was possible to
approximately calculate the area of Dalmatia lying outside Venetian Dalmatia
- a territory of about 5,700 km5 (including the former communes of Benkovac,
Drniπ, Imotski, Knin, Makarska, MetkoviÊ, Obrovac, Sinj, Vrgorac, as well
as parts of the communes of ©ibenik and Zadar).
Calculating the population becomes extremely complex since the Turkish
defters listed settlements and houses using Turkish names, which often do
not allow for today’s settlements to be determined.64 Therefore, I decided to
apply the indicator of population density in all of the Dalmatian hinterland
that was in Ottoman hands. I took it that the average density of the population
in this dominantly agrarian territory, excluding larger market towns, was
necessarily small, lower than in the coastal areas. Therefore, (by using the
61 We would like to mention in particular the works that this exceptional turkologist
published in Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae: Fehim Dæ. Spaho, ≈Jedan turski popis
Sinja i Vrlike iz 1604 godine«. Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae 12 (1985): pp. 21-120;
≈Splitsko zalee u prvim turskim popisima«. Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae 13 (1986):
pp. 47-86; ≈Skradinska nahija 1574 godine«. Acta historico-oeconomica Iugoslaviae 16 (1989):
pp. 79-107.
62 A mezra marks a scarcely populated territory, with primarily agrarian resources that are not
fully exploited.
63 F. Dæ. Spaho, ≈Splitsko zalee u prvim turskim popisima«: p. 49.
64 I can mention as an example the village of Gradac within the Drniπ municipality. In 1528,
according to the Turkish census, this village had 69 Christian houses and 3 houses of unmarried
Muslims. If it is assumed that there were 9 persons on average in each house, this would make
624 inhabitants in this village, which had 516 inhabitants in 1875 (KorenËiÊ, 1979). On the other
hand, the village of BidniÊ in the Split municipality had as many as 93 houses in 1528 (830 people),
while in 1857 it was only a hamlet belonging to Donji MuÊ, with 27 people. Did the Turkish censors
call BidniÊ the whole of Donji MuÊ?
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incomplete data from the published Turkish defters) I decided to take an
average of 10 inhabitants per square kilometre, which gives (a rounded figure
of) 57,000 inhabitants in the area of Dalmatia that were not included in the
census of the Venetian authorities. 
It should, however, be stressed that the censuses in Dalmatia at that time
included the islands of Cres, Loπinj, Krk and Rab, so that the territory of
Dalmatia in 1500 was not identical to that in 1700 (and a reciprocal situation is
true of Istria). On the other hand, the population of Venetian Dalmatia
included the inhabitants of Kotor and other settlements, which were then
part of Venetian Dalmatia, but which do not pertain to Croatia today. Therefore,
from the given number of inhabitants, I deducted an estimated number of
inhabitants of this part of Venetian Dalmatia (9,000).
The relatively low population density I thus obtained can be derived
from the understanding that in the first years of the sixteenth century there
was a relatively significant number of deserted settlements, i.e. settlements
in which agricultural neglect reached large proportions. This was not solely
a Croatia phenomenon. This phenomenon could be observed from the 14th
to the mid-17th century throughout Europe (the lost villages in Britain,
Wüstungen in Germany, mesta in Spain, villages deserts in France, and similar
phenomena in the Netherlands and Denmark).65 In our country, the reason
for this lay not just in the epidemics of the plague, the pillaging of village
holdings (due to the increased taxes occasioned by the war operations), and
climate changes, but also in some as yet unexplained disruptions in the
amount of yield and production. Due to all this, peasants increasingly fled
from the starved villages, and settled abroad (from the north of Croatia to
the west, to Burgenland, Slovakia and Bohemia, and from Dalmatia and Istria
to Italy). The Venetian authorities fought against this phenomenon by
colonising people (from what is today Montenegro and Albania), but the results
were modest until 1650 when (judging by the extant data) both agricultural
production and the population figures began to recover. Therefore, Miroslav
Bertoπa is right when he asserts that the standpoint of the old historiography
65 B. H. Slicher van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe, A.D. 500-1850. London:
Arnold, 1963, gives an extensive overview of the agricultural crisis in the 14th and 15th century in
Western Europe, finding almost identical phenomena throughout the broad West-European territory.
Croatia was obviously similar to these countries, although the causes of these phenomena were
not always the same. See also G. Cherubini, Agricoltura e società rurale nel medioevo. Firenze:
Sansoni, 1972.
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which claimed that only wars and disasters led to depopulation is unsustainable
since it neglects other (in many ways more significant) factors.66 Miroslav
Bertoπa’s accurate statement on the varied causes of demographic variations
in the population of Venetian Istria67 can, for a number of reasons, also be
applied to Dalmatia, as well as to Dubrovnik (for which we also have precise
data that confirm depopulation during the 16th and 17th centuries). 
Miroslav Bertoπa (1995) rightly speaks of Istria from the Venetian period as
if it had met the Apocalypse. Istria was depopulated between 1500 and 1700
due to the exodus of the population fleeing from the Turkish akinji (there were
five such incursions between 1470 and 1511), the wars of Venice and Austria,
the plague epidemics (the plague in the early 16th century lasted from 1507 to
1514), and other misfortunes. In 1556, the plague took two thirds of the
inhabitants of Buje and Piran, and after a few small-scale epidemics, the last
occurrence of the plague, which proved the most deadly, took place in 1631/2.
Malaria was also constant (taking, for example, three quarters of the population
of PoreË between 1580 and 1601). All of this, added to the Uskok war (1615-
1618), and the lack of attention that Venice paid towards economic revival, led
to stagnation in the population. According to Bertoπa’s data, which he presented
in another of his works, Venetian Istria had 52,765 inhabitants in 1554,68 it had
64,000 in 1655, and 69,415 in 1741. Naturally, the population of the Mark-
earldom of Pazin should be added to these data, and the parts of Istria which
are today in Slovenia have to be removed, to obtain the number of inhabitants
in the part of Istria which is today in Croatia. 
66 M. Bertoπa, MletaËka Istra u XVI. i XVII. stoljeÊu, I: p. 312. We should emphasise that
such voices are not isolated even in the new historiography. The excellent book by I. Maæuran
(Hrvati i Osmansko Carstvo), by concentrating on the horrific consequences of the expansion of
the Ottoman Empire to Croatia, indirectly supports such views. This is even more evident in
some contributions in Hrvatska demografska i demostrateπka drama.
67 Bertoπa writes: “The negative factors affecting the population - malaria (which took away
more people than the plague), epidemics of smallpox, typhus and other diseases, high mortality,
economic depletion related to the conditions in the Mediterranean and Adriatic basin, general
poverty, frequent shortages and years of starvation, the departure of the most able male labour
force to far-away battlefields (particularly in Dalmatia and Levant) at the time of long-lasting
wars which the Republic waged with Turkey, fear of new wars breaking out, as well as the politics
of Venice towards Istria, prevented the revitalisation of the population in the region during the
16th and 17th century (M. Bertoπa, MletaËka Istra u XVI. i XVII. stoljeÊu, I: p. 316 - emphasis by
V. S.).
68 Miroslav Bertoπa, ≈Neki povijesni i statistiËki podaci o demografskim kretanjima u Istri u
XVI i XVII stoljeÊu«. Radovi Instituta za hrvatsku povijest 11 (1978): pp. 103-129.
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I approached this calculation on the basis of data given by Miroslav Bertoπa69
(founded on archival research). In 1554, Venetian Istria had a population of
52,765, inhabiting an area of 2,587 km2. This figure includes the inhabitants of
the municipalities outside Croatia: Milje (1,548), Kopar (11,294), Izola
(1,725) and Piran (50% - 1,500). The figures shown in brackets include the
population of the mentioned towns and belonging territories, so that the
population of the Croatian part of Venetian Istria amounted that year to
36,698 inhabitants. To this estimate I added the population of the Mark-earldom
of Pazin (10,302), putting in this way the population of Istria at 47,000. This
figure does not include the population of Cres and Loπinj (which was then in
Venetian Dalmatia), or part of Liburnia which later became part of historical
Istria. I would also like to emphasise that subtracting and/or adding some
parts of the old historical provinces leads to significant changes in the derived
facts. For example, Venetian Istria in 1554 had a population density of 20.4
inhabitants per km2,70 but when Kopar, Izola, Milje and part of Piran (which are
now in Slovenia) are taken away, and when the inhabitants of the Mark-earldom
of Pazin are included, the average density falls to 18.0 inhabitants/km2. 
The data for 1700 are, however, incomparably more accurate, based on
the detailed and extensive work of J. Gelo and S. KrivoπiÊ (1990) who
thoroughly analysed all the sources known by that year (for this task, I.
Maæuran provided enormous help by publishing the census of Slavonia of
1698). All other data in Table 7 are based on the results of censuses limited
to the territory of contemporary Croatia and as such do not raise any doubts.
A timeline of the population of Croatia between 1500 and 1913 grew out of
all these activities (Table 7). The data are organised by historical province,
so that the reader can more easily verify the procedures I used to obtain data on
the population of today’s territory of Croatia in 1500. 
The first thing that draws attention in Table 7 is the decrease in the
population of Croatia between 1500 and 1700. In these 200 years, the
population of Croatia fell by 31%. On the other hand, the population of
Western Europe in the same time period grew by 41.4%, that of Eastern
Europe by 39.3%, and in the whole world by 37.8%. The population of our
neighbour, Austria, increased in this period by 25%, that of Italy by 24.8%,
Mediterranean Spain by 29%, and France by as much as 43% (Table 8).
69 M. Bertoπa, MletaËka Istra u XVI. i XVII. stoljeÊu, I: pp. 305-320.
70 M. Bertoπa, MletaËka Istra u XVI. i XVII. stoljeÊu, I: p. 309.
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Table 7 - Population of the territory of today’s Croatia (1500-1913)






1500 47,000 141,000 80,000 660,000 928,000
1700 56,440 76,263 26,067 158,430 327,300 644,500
1780 80,000 240,200 443,400 713,000 1,476,600
1820 100,800 280,250 544,439 856,080 1,781,569
1850 141,700 356,460 621,733 955,950 2,075,843
1880 179,575 432,284 764,294 1,130,075 2,506,228
1913 272,000 605,000 2,671,000 3,548,000
Country / area 1500 1700 1820
Index 1500 = 100
1700 1820
2,000 2,500 3,369 125.0 168.5
15,000 21,471 31,246 143.1 208.3
12,000 15,000 24,905 125.0 207.5
10,500 13,100 20,176 124.8 192.2
650 1,200 1,829 184.6 281.4
6,800 8,770 12,203 129.0 223.6
1,000 2,000 3,297 200.0 329.7
928 645 1,782 69.5 192.0
57,628 81,460 132,888 141.4 230.6
13,500 18,800 36,415 139.3 269.7
437,818 603,410 1,041,092 137.8 237.8
Table 8 - Population of some West European countries (1500-1820)
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As we can see, Croatia experienced a fall in population at a time when
the population was beginning to increase in Europe (1500-1700). What are
the causes of this? There is no doubt that the main reason was the expansion
of the Ottoman Empire: for centuries Croatia had been a border area tramped
over by armies, which without exception took a large toll in human lives.
This Croatian fate, to be Antemurale Christianitatis, for centuries led not
only to the loss of warriors’ lives, but also to the exodus of Croats towards
the west (Austria, Slovakia and Bohemia), as well as towards Mediterranean
lands (Dubrovnik, Dalmatia and Italy). However, at the same time hundreds
of thousands of people were taken to the east as slaves - to Anatolia and the
Eastern Balkans.71 Many consider that 1500, which I take here for comparison
with other countries, was not historically the year when the territory of
Croatia had the largest population. Gelo thinks that the population in Croatia
began to decline as early as in 1391 (when the Osmanli arrived on Croatian
territory for the first time), hence he sets the hypothesis that during the three
hundred years when the border between the Ottoman Empire and Europe
was constituted, the number of inhabitants of Croatia almost halved (which
could mean that Gelo assesses that around 1400 there were 1,200,000
inhabitants in the territory of today’s Croatia.72 Gelo describes the condition in
poetic terms, by stating that in these three hundred Turkish years, none of
the fifteen Croatian generations that lived in the more than three thousand
settlements - villages, market towns and cities (in three quarters of the plundered
territory of Croatia) - had lived their lives without being subjected to persecution,
pillage, the burning down of their homes, robbery or killing, so that at the
dawn of the eighteenth century, in the deserted and burnt homeland, life
71 Vjekoslav KlaiÊ, in his Povijest Hrvata, provides data on how this unfavourable fate hit the
Croats in the 15th and 16th century. Thus, on the occasion of the Turkish invasion in 1415, about
30,000 inhabitants were captured and taken to Turkey to become slaves. In 1469, the penetration
of the Turks into Lika and Krbava resulted in the abduction of 75,000 people; the incursion of the
Ottomans into Dalmatia in 1471 took away 30,000 inhabitants into slavery. The largest abductions
occurred after 1500, in 1510, 1514, 1532 (when Suleiman drew about 50,000 Croatians into slavery),
1536, 1556, and 1591-2. Later, Mladen LorkoviÊ, Narod i zemlja Hrvata, Zagreb: Matica hrvatska,
1939, on the basis on these historical sources, calculated that from 1415 to 1600, about 560,000
inhabitants of Croatia were taken into slavery. The estimate provided by the Venetian chronicler
Marin Sanudo, who claimed in 1533 that the Turks had taken away from the conquered lands and
border areas about 600,000 people, is even higher. It is probable that the data of contemporaries
were exaggerated, which can be assessed today in the light of well-known facts on the number of
inhabitants. However, they do indicate the huge losses of lives that occurred.
72 J. Gelo, ≈Kratka povijest hrvatskog puta u stvarnu demografsku provaliju«: p. 73.
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would begin for the new (sixteenth) generation, which numbered just about
half that (644,500) of their ancestors in 1391. 
The result we obtained is so significant that it seeks verification. I tried to
determine this on the basis of a comparative analysis of the population density
in some European countries. I approached it from a simple economic standpoint:
in 1500 and 1700, Europe was a predominantly agrarian continent whose
number of inhabitants living in a particular area was determined by the potential
of the land to produce a sufficient quantity of food. Since production procedures
were similar throughout Europe (though there were great differences in the
amount and fertility of the soil), and if we assume that there was an equal
amount of fertile soil, the number of inhabitants could vary only within the
variables mentioned above. For this purpose I drew up Table 9 from which it
can be derived that in 1500 the density of the population in Croatia (on the basis
of the estimate above) was in most cases similar to the density of the population
in Central Europe (Hungary, Switzerland, Italy and Austria); it was slightly
higher than the population density of Britain and Spain, while the density was
significantly higher in the Netherlands, France and Germany - all those countries
that had made much more progress in crafts, navigation, trade and other
non-agricultural activities at that time.
The first thing that stands out related to Croatia is the exceptional density of
the population in the Republic of Dubrovnik, which was almost three times
higher than other densely populated countries in the same period. The cause
of this, in my opinion, is the exodus of the population from the Balkan
hinterland fleeing the Ottoman Empire. Some time before the year in
question, the Serbian state under despot rule had disappeared (1459),
Bosnia had been destroyed (1463), and the border of the Ottoman Empire
had permanently moved westwards. The akinji and other Ottoman troops
were penetrating deeper and deeper into the territory of Croatia, Slavonia
and Hungary. There was a general feeling of insecurity, so that many
families decided to leave their homes. 
Dubrovnik was close by, offering work on its ships, in textile manufacturing,
and in other jobs. However, the agriculture of Dubrovnik alone could not
produce enough food, so that wheat was imported by ship to feed the
hungry population.73 Still, the most important factor was that the shipping
73 Bogumil Hrabak, Izvoz æitarica iz Osmanlijskog carstva u XIV, XV i XVI stoljeÊu. Priπtina:
Zajednica nauËnih ustanova Kosova, 1971.
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companies of Dubrovnik offered work. But we will look at this in more de-
tail when we consider the estimated per capita GDP. 
Table 9 - Population density in some European countries in 1500 and 1700
Country Area(000 km2)
Number of inhabitants
in millions by 1 km2
1500 1700 1500 1700
83.8 2.0 2.5 24 30
93.0 1.25 1.25 14 14
301.2 10.50 13.30 35 44
127.9 3.0 4.5 23 35
41.3 0.65 1.20 16 29
504.8 6.80 8.77 14 17
547.0 15.0 21.5 27 39
40.8 0.95 1.90 23 47
357.0 12.00 15.00 34 42
244.0 3.94 8.57 16 35
in thousands
1.0 80 26.1 83 27
3.1 47 56.4 20 18
10.8 141 76.3 12 7
41.6 660.0 485.7 16 12
56.5 928 644.5 17 11
Source: Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, Atlas of World Population History. Middlesex: Penguin
Books, 1978; Angus Maddison, The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective. Paris, 2001; Jakov
Gelo and Stjepan KrivoπiÊ, Razvitak stanovniπtva na tlu Hrvatske. Zagreb: Institut za ekonomska
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What did this development mean for Croatia in comparative terms? Now
that we have Maddison’s data at our disposal it is not difficult to give a
quantitative answer (Table 10). 
The decrease in the number of inhabitants in Croatia between 1500 and
1700 halved the significance of Croatia in terms of the population of Western
Europe and of the world. However, the sudden growth of the Croatian
population during the demographic transition in the 18th and 19th century,
together with immigrations to Croatian territory (of Germans and Hungarians,
Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Ruthenians, not to mention others) provided
an opportunity for Croatia to very nearly restore its former significance in
the West European context by 1913. Since the share of the European population
in the world population grew during the 19th century, the Croatian share in
the world population in 1913 climbed again to 2‰ of the world population,
the same as it had been in 1500. However, in the 20th century, a demographic
explosion occurred (outside Europe), while Croatia recorded high losses of
human lives in the course of three wars (two world wars and the war for
independence), and losses in the post-war period through emigration and
other misfortunes. This caused a considerable decrease in the significance of
Croatia in the world population in the 20th century, together with a decrease
in the significance of Croatia in the West European population. Croatia now
Table 10 - Share of Croatia in the population of Western Europe and the World
(1500-1998)
Year
Share of Croatia in the population (in ‰)






*The population in Croatia in 1998 according to: Alica Wertheimer-BaletiÊ, ≈DugoroËni demografski
procesi u Hrvatskoj«: in Hrvatska demografska i demostrateπka drama, ed. V. PavletiÊ. Zagreb: Matica
hrvatska, 2002: p. 15.
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makes up only a little more than 1% of the West European population and
less than one per mill of the world population. At the end of the 20th century,
Croatia had only a third of the share in the world population that it had in
1913. There is no doubt that this result is a matter of concern.
5.2. Estimating the level of gross domestic product of Croatia, 1500-1913
I estimated the level of gross domestic product of Croatia for the period
1850-1913 in one of my earlier works (1999), which was based on statistical
and other sources on agricultural production, number of livestock, workforce
and many other indicators that had been diligently collected by Austrian
statisticians (headed by Inam-Sternegg, an outstanding economic historian).
All these values were expressed in dollars at the purchasing power of 1990
and calculated on the basis of multilateral purchasing power, mirroring the
method used by Maddison in both of his works (1995 and 2001). Since
there have been no objections to this method of calculation in the last four
years, I have left these estimates unchanged.
Working backwards, I first estimated per capita GDP for the year 1820.
To accomplish this task, I used Maddison’s estimates of trends in per capita
GDP in Austria and Italy. I believe that the result for this particular year will
be indisputable. However, estimates for earlier years are much more complex
and require more detailed explanation, particularly in view of the fact that I am
treading on new ground in this, for economic history, terra incognita.
The estimate of per capita GDP for the years 1500 and 1700 is based on
Maddison’s estimates for Italy and Austria. These in turn are based on the
critical evaluation of the level of gross domestic product carried out by the
authors before him. Thus, P. Malanima74 maintained that between 1500 and
1700, per capita income in Italy decreased, basing his conclusion on a series
of indicators on manufacturing and trading activities in the towns of that
time, as well as on estimates on the level of food consumption, wages, and
other items. His findings confirmed earlier claims by C. M. Cipolla,75 who,
moreover, believed that from the late 15th to the 17th century Italy suffered
74 Paolo Malanima, Economia preindustriale. Milano: Mondadori, 1995.
75 Carlo M. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy. New
York: Norton, 1976.
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retrogression even in the level of per capita income. His findings were critically
analysed by A. Maddison and H. van der Wee in the study submitted at the
11th International Congress of Economic Historians.76 On that occasion they
supported the theses by D. Sella77 and T. Rapp.78 who claimed that there was
progress in Spanish Lombardy (with Milan as its capital), but that in the
case of Venice the level of per capita income stagnated (but did not decline).
Starting from these claims, Maddison assumed that per capita income in Italy
was stagnant between 1500 and 1820, which, compared to the progress
achieved in Northern and Western Europe, meant that in relative terms Italy
lagged behind. 
However, although Maddison considers Venice the most developed area
of the world at that time, he does not quantify the level of income in the
Venetian Republic with the level of per capita GDP. Starting from Maddison’s
general thesis that Venice in that period had the highest per capita GDP in
the world, I assumed that in the year 1500 the level of per capita income in
Venice exceeded that of Italy by 20% on average. Since the Italian per capita
GDP was constant (according to Maddison) both in 1500 and 1700 and
amounted to 1,100 dollars (1990 international dollars), according to my
calculations, the level of per capita GDP in the Venetian Republic came to
1,320 dollars. But this is the average for all parts of the Venetian Republic:
the city of Venice must have had a higher income than Terraferma, or Istria
and Dalmatia. In my estimate (Table 9), I assume that Venetian Dalmatia
generated two thirds of the average income of the Venetian Republic in
1500, and three fifths in 1700 (the Turkish onslaughts after 1500 towards
the Dalmatian coast and their conquest of a part of the territory caused, to
my mind, Dalmatia to fall further behind the average of the Venetian
Republic). The amount for Dalmatia obtained in this way for the year 1500
should be complemented with data for the parts under Turkish rule. As I
previously established that there were 57,000 people living in this area, the
76 A. Maddison and H. van der Wee, ≈Economic Growth and Structural Change: Comparative
Approaches over the Long Run«, in: Proceedings of the Eleventh International Economic History
Congress. Milano, 1994.
77 Domenico Sella, Crisis and Continuity: The Economy of Spanish Lombardy in the Seven-
teenth Century. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1979.
78 Richard T. Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline in Seventeenth-Century Venice. Harvard
University Press, 1976.
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majority of whom were farmers, I adopted Maddison’s estimate (which relates
to the predominantly agrarian countries of Western and Eastern Europe for
1500) of 462 dollars per capita. Such a low level of income in the agrarian
regions of the Dalmatian hinterland decreased the average per capita income
for Dalmatia as a whole (Venetian Dalmatia 870 dollars, the hinterland 462
dollars, averaging 705 dollars per capita). I used the same approach for
Istria, but I estimated that the rate of development in 1500 was slightly lower
than that in Venetian Dalmatia. However, since the hinterland of Venetian
Istria was sparsely populated (the Mark-earldom of Pazin), then, on the
whole, according to my estimate, Istria had a higher per capita GDP than the
whole of Dalmatia in 1500. After 1500, Istria suffered impoverishment.79
For me, the hardest task was to estimate the level of per capita gross
domestic product in the Republic of Dubrovnik. The high number of inhabitants
in 1500 testifies that the Republic was very densely populated (over 80
people per square kilometre, compared to 12-20 in other parts of Croatia
and only 15-25 in the neighbouring countries of that time). Dubrovnik of
that time must have been so large due to large-scale flights of the Balkan
population leaving the territories that had been conquered or threatened by
the Turks. These people were mostly farmers80 whose work productivity
was even then lower than that of craftsmen and/or merchants.81 It is for this
reason that I assumed that per capita GDP in Dubrovnik in 1500 accounted
79 Miroslav Bertoπa, Istarsko vrijeme proπlo. Pula: Glas Istre and »akavski sabor, 1978.
80 This is pointed out largely because the then scarce aristocracy and Balkan merchants
considered Dubrovnik the Switzerland of that period, into which money should be brought and
kept for security. Thus Vuk Vinaver, ≈Problem proizvodnje srebra u srednjovjekovnoj Srbiji«.
Istoriski zapisi 13/3 (1960), says that the Serbian despot and Turkish vassal –urad BrankoviÊ
stored his gold reserve in Dubrovnik in 1441. It consisted of 175 kg of gold, 112.3 kg of gold
mixed with silver, 973.15 kg of silver (all in bullion), 114.13 kg of silverware and one million
Turkish aspers (silver coins). The treasurers of the Dubrovnik Republic, according to the
description by Philippus de Diversis, looked all their lives after the deposited wealth committed
to their care by either the Dubrovnik municipality or by the neighbouring rulers. The rulers of the
neighbouring regions deposited their wealth, gold and silver with the government of Dubrovnik,
where they felt it was as secure as if it were deposited in the most secure house. It is very possible
that the same was done by other wealthy people from the hinterland of Dubrovnik (merchants and
feudal lords). For this reason, Dubrovnik might be considered a haven for capital arriving from
the Balkan hinterland (see: Vladimir StipetiÊ, Povijest hrvatske ekonomske misli (1298-1847).
Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 2001: pp. 110-115). 
81 B. H. Slicher van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe AD 500-1850. 
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for only 70% of per capita GDP of the Venetian Republic,82 whereas the
percentage was slightly below 70% in the year 1700 (the consequences of
an earthquake that devastated the city and the costs of dealing with the aftermath).
A slightly higher per capita product in Dubrovnik than that in Venetian Dalmatia
(in 1500: 930 against 870) was also mentioned in a travelogue written by
Giovanni Battista Giustiniani, who stayed in Zadar, ©ibenik, Trogir, Split
and Dubrovnik. According to B. KrekiÊ,83 Giustiniani found that the nobility
and the citizens of Dalmatian towns were very poor, the nobility in particular,
because their lands had been abandoned or left uncultivated for fear of the
Turks. In contrast, Giustiniani finds exceptional wealth in Dubrovnik, which
he attributes to the trade and maritime economy that flourished in Dubrovnik at
that time. Even if Giustiniani did exaggerate a little (as suggested by KrekiÊ84),
the fact that he stresses the differences in the level of well-being between
Dalmatia and Dubrovnik is indicative. 
I submitted my estimates to the analytical scrutiny of well-known data from
the economic history of Dubrovnik. Obviously, agriculture in the Republic of
Dubrovnik could not have sustained such a large number of inhabitants. Since
Dubrovnik authorities estimated that, to satisfy the needs of the population,
they had to ensure a quantity of 216 kilograms of grain a year (from domestic
production and from imports), the import of grain was inevitable. Dubrovnik
did precisely this, importing grain by ship and storing it in granary holes every
year.85 The quantity of imports indicates that the population in the area of the
82 Philippus de Diversis (Diversi), who lived in Dubrovnik between 1434 and 1441 (after
spending ten years of his life in Venice), in 1440 also mentions the fact that Dubrovnik lagged
behind the level of income generated by Italy and Venice. In his book Diversi writes that Italy
was the most advanced and in every sense the wealthiest country. He points out, however, the
entrepreneurial spirit of Dubrovnik people, which drives noblemen to send their children into
trading business, since they think and believe that happiness is contained in wealth, and virtue in
its acquisition and greedy hoarding ... As opposed to these entrepreneurs, seamen and merchants,
the majority of other people live in abject poverty. Among the poor, sailors and peasants who till
their fields, vineyards and gardens are the most numerous ... but the Dubrovnik area, due to
its infertile lands and a large number of people, yields such small income that no family can
make a living from their holding ...”. See more details on Diversi in: V. StipetiÊ, Povijest hrvatske
ekonomske misli: pp. 100-118.
83 Bariπa KrekiÊ, ≈Developed Autonomy: The Patricians in Dubrovnik and Dalmatian Cities«,
in: Urban Society of Eastern Europe in Premodern Times, ed. B. KrekiÊ. Berkeley-Los Angeles-
London: University of California Press, 1987: p. 193.
84 Ibid.
85 See: B. Hrabak, Izvoz æitarica iz Osmanlijskog carstva u XIV, XV i XVI stoljeÊu.
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Dubrovnik Republic was large, but also that the Republic had sufficient means
to procure grain on the Mediterranean market. The principal source of foreign-
trade income for Dubrovnik came from maritime activities: Dubrovnik had
shipyards, where ships were built for its fleet. The fleet was very large, as pro-
ven by Jorjo TadiÊ86 some sixty years ago, with 3,000 people working on the
vessels around 1500. Drawing upon archive sources for the years 1539 to
1544, TadiÊ found as many as 132 vessels and calculated their carrying capac-
ity. The fleet grew to as many as 170 ships by the end of the 16th century, with
the carrying capacity increasing twofold compared to 1540 (33,000 wagons in
the period 1570-85 against 15,200 in the period 1539-44). What this meant for
the European merchant fleet of that time can be seen in comparison with Mad-
dison’s data (Table 11). All the data were reduced to a carrying capacity ex-
pressed in thousands of metric tons, whereby I used the calculations made by
Mijo MirkoviÊ.87 According to the comparison, the merchant fleet of Dubrov-
nik in 1570 was larger than that of England, and was slightly smaller than the
French merchant fleet. The rise of the merchant fleet, occurring in Dubrovnik
in the century between 1470 and 1570, unveils the secret of Dubrovnik’s pro-
sperity of that time, but also the causes of later stagnation. 
86 Jorjo TadiÊ, Organizacija dubrovaËkog pomorstva u 16. veku. Dubrovnik, 1952.
87 Mijo MirkoviÊ, Ekonomska historija Jugoslavije, 1. Pula-Rijeka: »akavski sabor etc., 1985:
pp. 171-172.
Source: Angus Maddison, The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective. Paris, 2001: p. 77); for
Dubrovnik in 1540 and 1570: Jorjo TadiÊ, Organizacija dubrovaËkog pomorstva u 16. veku. Dubrovnik,
1952; Mijo MirkoviÊ, Ekonomska historija Jugoslavije, 1. Pula-Rijeka, 1985: p. 171; the year 1670 -
estimate by V. StipetiÊ according to F. M. Appendini.
Country 1470 1570 1670 1780
The Netherlands 60 232 568 450
Germany 60 110 104 155
England ... 51 260 1000
France ... 80 80 700
Italy, Portugal and Spain ... ... 250 546
Denmark, Norway and Sweden ... ... ... 550
Republic of Dubrovnik 29 63 10 ...
Table 11 - European merchant fleet 1470-1780 (carrying capacity in thousands of
metric tons)
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TadiÊ estimates that the maritime affairs of Dubrovnik around 1570 provided
employment for about 5,000 people, which generated income for about
40,000 families (some families had 2 members working on ships). The maritime
economy was exceptionally profitable in Mediterranean trade, but its importance
waned with the transfer of the main merchant routes from the Mediterranean
to the Atlantic (after 1570). This fact led to a sharp rise in the merchant
fleets of the Netherlands, England, Portugal and Spain (as seen in Table 11).
Taking into account the low life expectancy of that time, in around 1500
Dubrovnik had about 18,000 men of working age. This means that in that
year almost one third of the economically active population of Dubrovnik
were engaged in maritime activities (seamen + shipyards). Another 1,500 of
the economically active population were merchants who had offices and
warehouses in Dubrovnik, from where they shipped caravans loaded with
goods to Balkan destinations, where the people from Dubrovnik were in
turn engaged in collecting and sending exchange goods back to Dubrovnik;
there were also 500 craftsmen (with about 1,000 workers); another thousand
were employed in the textile industry (including women, who spun thread at
home). Aristocratic and merchant families employed numerous servants;
therefore, according to this rough estimate, around the year 1500 fewer than
one half of the men in Dubrovnik were employed in primary activities
(agriculture, fishing and forestry), which reflects the structure of the European
population at the end of the 19th century.88 However, it is difficult to make a
completely accurate estimate because some of the people were employed in
different jobs. Ship crews were partly made up of farmers (part-time farming
is not an invention of the twentieth century!); likewise, farmers also found
employment in the building industry (house construction, but also working
in quarries), in manufacturing and in crafts, depending on the demand for
certain services and/or activities. Thus, farmers became a classic reservoir
of manpower, which was more fully drawn upon in times of the growing
needs of trade, seafaring, building and other activities. The secret of
Dubrovnik’s high income of that time lies, therefore, in the versatile structure
of employment. This internal economic power made it possible for Dubrovnik
to gain independence from Venice (1358) when Venice was at the height of its
power, and even to expand into its area of interest, both territorially and
economically. In the following centuries, despite its indubitable military
88 V. StipetiÊ, Povijest hrvatske ekonomske misli.
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inferiority, Dubrovnik competed with Venice on an economic plane, albeit
with varying fortune (yet, always with a positive final outcome). For this
reason, we can rightly claim that Dubrovnik of this period should not be
compared with many Italian towns on the western coast of the Adriatic;
instead, within Mediterranean history, it should be designated the position
of Monaco - a state which reached the very peak of world power in this
historical interval.
The data on gross domestic product in 1500 do not, therefore, represent
the highest achieved power of Dubrovnik, but only a moment in its rise to
the apogee of power and wealth (which would be realised only in the second
half of the 16th century). The same could be said for Dalmatia and Istria,
although there are considerably fewer indicators of the power of regional
economy (there are indicators for individual centres, such as Zadar, Hvar
and others).
I based my estimate of the level of per capita gross domestic product for
Croatia and Slavonia on the two dominantly agrarian countries for which
Maddison gives data. The working productivity of the medieval peasant did
not vary significantly because it was rooted in traditions and processes that
had remained unchanged for centuries.89 The very few existing towns
retrogressed in the period between 1500 and 1700. Slavonia was particularly
afflicted by the Vienna war (1683-1699), a number of Slavonian villages
were abandoned90 because the population had either fled from their villages
(the retreat of the Muslim population into Bosnia) or was killed in the
bloodthirsty raids of the warring parties.91
How does one estimate the level of gross domestic product in this area,
for which there is some indication of the size of population, but no estimates
on agricultural or other production? In the estimation for 1500 I started from
the fact that farming was performed on better, more fertile land than in the
rest of Eastern Europe; consequently, per capita GDP was 5% higher in this
89 B. H. Slicher van Bath, The Agrarian History of Western Europe AD 500-1850.
90 According to the 1698 census, Slavonia had 491 inhabited settlements and 240 uninhabited
villages. There were about 80,000 people, only slightly more than one third of the population of
1680. See: Vladimir StipetiÊ, ≈Predgovor«, in: Ive Maæuran, Popis naselja i stanovniπtva u
Slavoniji 1698 godine. Osijek: Zavod za znanstveni rad JAZUu Osijeku, 1988: pp. 7-10.
91 I. Maæuran, Popis naselja i stanovniπtva u Slavoniji 1698 godine.
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area than in Eastern Europe (462 dollars in 1500) and reached 490 dollars
per capita. In 1700, in my estimate, farming estates had only just begun to
regenerate; there was little livestock, the land was neglected, there were no
good seeds, and the new people were unfamiliar with the land they were
working on. A combination of all these factors resulted in lower yields.
Consequently, per capita GDP in this area remained low and retained the
same level as in 1500. I stress the word low, because Maddison estimates
that per capita GDP between 1500 and 1700 rose by 22% in Eastern Europe;
however, such devastating wars as were fought on the territory of Croatia
and Slavonia during the 16th and the 17th centuries were recorded neither in
the Czech state nor in Slovakia, Poland and Russia. 
The results, collected by very complex procedures, are given in Table 12
and in Figures 4, 5 and 6.
Table 12 - Gross domestic product of Croatia (1500-1913) by region
Area




A Total GDP (in million 1990 international $)
1500 74 100 38 323 535
1700 24 48 41 238 351
1820 147 60 707 914
1850 191 98 809 1,098
1880 288 164 1,320 1,773
1913 671 506 3,687 4,864
B Per capita GDP (in 1990 $)
1500 930 706 800 490 577
1700 900 635 720 490 545
1820 525 595 505 513
1850 536 690 515 529
1880 667 915 698 709
1913 1,136 1,909 1,366 1,371
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The results astounded me. Not only did Croatia lose over one quarter of
its population between 1500 and 1700, but it was impoverished - the total
GDP decreased by one third during these two hundred years, while per capita
GDP dropped by almost 5%. At the time in which the economic well-being
of the average citizen in other countries had begun to rise (for this is the
idea of per capita GDP indicators given in item B in Table 12), Croatia
experienced a reverse trend. The reasons for this are many: the long-lasting
Vienna war (during which a third of the Slavonian villages were abandoned,
while the remaining villagers lived in abject poverty after the plundering
armies had passed through the area), the stagnation of Venice, the dramatic
loss of economic potential of the Dubrovnik Republic on the eve of and after
the big earthquake, and a variety of other reasons. It is in this period that a
gap opened and widened between Croatia and Western Europe, which would
reach unprecedented proportions in the future.
Figure 4 - Gross domestic product of Croatia (1500-1913) by region
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In the next 120 years (1700-1820) the total generated gross domestic
product increased (by as much as 2.6 times), but exclusively as a result of
increased population, since per capita gross domestic product continued to
slide downwards (by another 5% over the 120 years). The impoverishment
of the population went on; thus, the famous comment made by P. Ritter
VitezoviÊ, “if you meet an abjectly poor person in Europe, it must be a
Slav” is not surprising at all. These results give economic confirmation to
the literary inscription in his book Two Centuries of Grieving Croatia
(Plorantis Croatiae saecula duo - written in Latin). He writes: “Incessant
wars have for centuries devastated Croatia, ravaging the fields of its farmers,
the settlements and towns of its citizens, the fortified towns of its noblemen,
the castles of its lords, and the temples of its clergy. These people have all
been killed, or taken into lifelong slavery, or exiled and forced to flee. The
Figure 5 - Structure of population of the present territory of Croatia by region (1500-
1913)
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whole country is enveloped in a veil of sadness, leaving its citizens to grieve
for the rest of their lives, its neighbours to share in the grief, and the entire
Christian world to commiserate”.92
I wanted to check this result with historical facts. In his texts, A. M.
ReljkoviÊ, for example, talks about the considerable progress achieved by
the Slavonian village in the first seventy years of the 18th century (the second
edition of Satir came out in Osijek in 1779). At that time, the largest
proportion of the Croatian population lived in that area. However, it seems
that the Austrian-Turkish war (started in 1785) led to a decline in agriculture,
the main economic activity. Count OrπiÊ writes that in 1786 the royal armies
Figure 6 - Structure of gross domestic product of the present territory of Croatia by
region (1500-1913)
92 For more on the economic estimates of P. Ritter VitezoviÊ, see: V. StipetiÊ, Povijest hrvatske
ekonomske misli: pp. 397-399.
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halted land cultivation by mobilising villagers and carriages, which led to
famine. Many villagers, stricken by famine, were found dead at the roadside,
in forests, and their children in pastures.93 Famine also ravaged Dalmatia94
and Istria. Tens of thousands of men were forced to abandon their homes and
fight in the Napoleonic wars, further hindering land cultivation. The crisis
culminated in large-scale famine in the Croatian lands in 1816/7, which
claimed thousands of lives. The survivors managed to overcome hunger by
slaughtering livestock, postponing the recovery of agriculture until the livestock
fund was regenerated.95
These conditions in agriculture, combined with the Continental Blockade,
interrupted lucrative trade in grains carried along the rivers Sava and Kupa
to the Adriatic ports.96 The cessation of this trade in turn made seamen’s
condition of life more difficult: sailing ships, which had sustained thousands of
families, remained in ports waiting futilely for cargo to be pulled, at great
risk, through the Continental Blockade. The impoverished villages, the merchants
and seamen showed little demand for artisan products. This whirl of cause-
effect events hurt the economy in towns. Therefore, I believe that a fall in
per capita gross domestic product was not unexpected, but was the inevitable
result of the problems described above, problems with which the Croatian
economy wrestled at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century.
93 A. OrπiÊ SlavetiËki, Rod OrπiÊa. Zagreb: Hrvatski izdavalaËko-bibliografski zavod, 1943.
94 ©ime PeriËiÊ, ≈Gladne godine u MletaËkoj Dalmaciji XVIII. stoljeÊa«, in: Radovi Zavoda
JAZU u Zadru 27-28 (1981): pp. 179-194.
95 Retrogression in Croatia at the beginning of the 19th century is also elaborated on by Imbro
IgnjatijeviÊ Tkalac: agriculture and trade were increasingly deteriorating - Croatia had never had
developed industry - and when terrible famine struck in 1817, the whole population became
extremely poor. As in Poland in the past, usury flourished as never before and ruined landowners
in the first place. In order to keep their heads above water, they borrowed at a nominal rate of 10
or 12 percent. Since they could not pay back in cash, they paid in nature - wine, grain, plums (for
brandy), hay, building timber and fuelwood: creditors would buy these products from them at
ridiculous prices, so that interest would grow to between 30 and 49 percent. Some of the
landowners tried to help themselves by leasing a part of their allodial land with a house and a
holding to their serfs. Thus, a landowner would end up having only 5 or 6 serf homes from the 50
or more he had previously owned. He could not cultivate his land with so few serfs, and was
forced to sink completely. Imbro IgnjatoviÊ Tkalac, Uspomene iz Hrvatske. Zagreb: MH, 1945:
p. 53 (italics by V. S.).
96 I. I. Tkalac, Uspomene iz Hrvatske: pp. 19-31, cites the example of his grandfather, a
merchant from Karlovac, who was impoverished during the Turkish war on account of voluntary
war taxes, surtaxes and the confiscation of cattle and grain.
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It was only after 1820 that the Croatian economy and the well-being of
its citizens started to improve. In the beginning, the growth was slow (per
capita gross domestic product grew by only 5% between 1820 and 1850, or
by 0.07% per year), but it gained momentum in the second half of the 19th
century (and rose by 34% or 0.98% annually between 1850 and 1880), to
reach 2.02% annually at the turn of the century (the increase in per capita
gross domestic product amounted to 93.4% between 1880 and 1913). Thus, in
terms of well-being, it was not until the turn of the 20th century that Croatia
began to catch up with Western Europe.
5.3. Comparative analysis of research results in the gross domestic
product of Croatia (1500 - 1913)
Data from Maddison’s research (Table 13) show an immense contrast
between the economic performances of Croatia and other countries. During
these two centuries - between 1500 and 1700 - Austria, France and all
Scandinavian countries increased their per capita gross domestic product
(Austria by 40%, France by 36%, England by 75%, Denmark and Switzerland
by 41%, etc.). Mediterranean Europe experienced slower development - in
1700, Italy stagnated at the level reached in 1500, whereas Spain increased
its per capita GDP by 29% - slower than other West European countries
despite its enormous colonial empire. Of all the European countries for
which we possess data, only Croatia recorded an economic regression, since
in 1700 its per capita GDP was 5.5% lower than in 1500. In that year, Croatia
had the lowest per capita GDP of all the countries listed in the Table (Figure 7).
An economic reservation should be made here in interpreting data related to
the level of gross domestic product - both in terms of total and per capita
GDP. Data for Croatia were accurately derived from data for individual regions,
but they do not refer to a unified Croatian national market, but to different
countries (Venice, Dubrovnik, Austria and Hungary). The market is the first
school in which nationalism is taught: in Croatia, too, trade was a school in
which merchants, clergy and noblemen broadened their horizons in their attempt
to create a unified national market (from PribojeviÊ and Orbini through
KriæaniÊ and VitezoviÊ to Gaj and Seljan), which was non-existent at that
time. Data on the total gross domestic product on the territory of Croatia,
presented in Table 12, do not therefore give a realistic picture of the national
market, because until 1913 this market remained disunited and fragmented,
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while aspirations towards a unified market were utopian and romantic. All
economic thinkers in Croatia dreamt of creating a large national market,
clashing in the process with the Venetian, Austrian and Hungarian realisation
of a unified market. The conflict between aspirations and their realisation
could not be solved in the past,97 and neither can it be solved now by aggregating
data on the generated gross domestic product, as we have done in Table
12. 
97 Rudolf BiÊaniÊ, Doba manufakture u Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji (1750-1869), 1 (Hrvatska
ekonomika na prijelazu iz feudalizma u kapitalizam). Zagreb: JAZU, 1951.
Table 13 - Per capita gross domestic product, selected countries (1500-1913)
Sources: Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1920. Paris, 1995; Angus Maddison,
The World Economy - A Millennial Perspective. Paris, 2001; for Croatia, this study.
Country 1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1913
707 837 993 1,218 1,863 3,465
727 841 986 1,230 1,876 3,485
1,100 1,100 1,100 1,117 1,499 2,564
714 974 1,250 1,707 3,191 4,921
738 875 1,039 1,274 2,003 3,912
453 538 638 781 1,140 2,111
695 824 977 1,198 1,664 3,096
640 760 900 1,104 1,432 2,501
742 880 1,044 1,280 2,202 4,266
698 900 900 1,063 1,376 2,255
774 894 1,024 1,232 1,974 3,473
462 516 566 636 871 1,527
.. .. .. 849 1,164 2,096
500 553 311 689 943 1,488
577 .. 545 513 596 1,371
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To make matters worse, a decline in the level of per capita gross domestic
product continued in Croatia even after 1700 and lasted until 1820. The reasons
for this were manifold: almost half of Croatia’s territory was in the Military
Border region, where the dominant extensive agriculture regressed every
time Austrian armies, and then Napoleon’s armies, waged wars, which were
frequent between 1700 and 1820. On the other hand, the economic recession
of Venice and the Dubrovnik Republic during the 18th and the beginning of
the 19th century deepened the crisis in the Military Border region. It is for
this reason that the gap between Croatia and other Western European countries
widened, since the latter continued to advance in the period between 1700
and 1820 (Austria increased its per capita gross domestic product by 23%,
France by 22%, England by 37%, Scandinavian countries by about 23%,
with Spain and Switzerland achieving only a slightly lower growth). 
Figure 7 - Per capita gross domestic product, selected countries (1500-1913)
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98 Mirjana Gross, PoËeci moderne Hrvatske. Zagreb: Globus, 1985.
99 Vladimir StipetiÊ, ≈Gospodarski rast Hrvatske i Srediπnje Europe izmeu 1850. i 1913.
godine«. Rad HAZU 478 (1999): pp. 81-133.
Only after 1820 did Croatia begin to rise economically: the rise was
somewhat slower in the first 50 years (from 1820 to 1870, per capita
GDP increased from 513 to 596 international dollars, which was an increase
of 16.2% over the 50 years, or an increase of 0.30% annually) than in the
second part of the observed period (when from 1870 to 1913 it increased by
13% or by 1.96% annually, six times faster than in the previous 50-year
period). This relatively favourable result during the 19th century (in 1913 it
reached an index of 267, if the year 1820 is marked 100) was catching up with
Western Europe (in the period from 1820 to 1913 its growth dynamics was
slightly slower than that in Croatia). The growth dynamics in Croatia was
faster than that in Eastern Europe (in Maddison’s estimate), and was perceptibly
faster than the growth dynamics achieved by the world in that century.
According to these findings, in 1500 Croatia generated per capita GDP which
was 2% higher than the world average: in 1700, Croatia was 11% below the
world average, in 1820 it was as much as 21% below the world average, and
in 1870 it was 31% below the world average. This constant lagging behind the
world average in economic well-being was halted only in the period between
1870 and 1913, so that in 1913 Croatia lagged behind the world average by
only 9%. However, while comparison with the world average was favourable
for Croatia, the ratios with the West European average were less so. If the
well-being of a Western European is denoted by 100, then per capita GDP in
Croatia was as follows: in 1500 - 74%; in 1700 - 53%; in 1820 - 42%; in 1870
only 30%. It began to rise until World War I and reached 39% in 1913.
The beginnings of a modern, dynamic and economically developing Croatia
should therefore be sought in the second half of the 19th century, as Mirjana
Gross attempted to do.98 At that time, liberalised Austrian economic politics
stimulated modernisation and the transformation of a traditionally feudal
society into a bourgeois society by broadening capitalist social relationships.
In the first fifty years, the pace of modernisation was slower (and not only
because of the Military Border region), but it gained momentum, as we have
seen, only in 1870 onwards (despite the agrarian crisis that shook Europe
between 1873 and 1895). I elaborated on this topic in more detail from the
standpoint of economic development dynamics in one of my earlier works,99
so I will not repeat my opinions here.
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6. In place of a conclusion 
I believe that the account given here allows for a more realistic consideration
of the place and role of the Croatian economy in West European and world
proportions. I have attempted to use the results of the analysis to indicate the
possibilities of a quantitative economic-historical analysis and to identify more
accurately the deep roots of our present economic situation. The refinement
of the presented data on the economic development of Croatia between
1500 and 1913, with a more complete analysis of all economic parameters,
will not only make it possible to adopt more definite attitudes about the
economic basis of Croatian history, but will also allow us to interpret more
easily the background of a country which, in the period of prosperity, gave
birth to such a large pleiad of scientists, writers and artists.
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